kaczynski's manifesto – from a university website
"industrial society and its future" – all freekin 50 pages
1. The Industrial Revolution and its
consequences have been a disaster for the human race. They have greatly
increased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in "advanced"
countries, but they have destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling,
have subjected human beings to indignities, have led to widespread psychological
suffering (in the Third World to physical suffering as well) and have inflicted
severe damage on the natural world. The continued development of technology
will worsen the situation. It will certainly subject human beings to greater
indignities and inflict greater damage on the natural world, it will probably
lead to greater social disruption and psychological suffering, and it may lead
to increased physical suffering even in "advanced" countries.
2. The industrial-technological system may
survive or it may break down. If it survives, it MAY eventually achieve a low
level of physical and psychological suffering, but only after passing through a
long and very painful period of adjustment and only at the cost of permanently
reducing human beings and many other living organisms to engineered products
and mere cogs in the social machine. Furthermore, if the system survives, the
consequences will be inevitable: There is no way of reforming or modifying the
system so as to prevent it from depriving people of dignity and autonomy.
3. If the system breaks down the consequences
will still be very painful. But the bigger the system grows the more disastrous
the results of its breakdown will be, so if it is to break down it had best
break down sooner rather than later.
4. We therefore advocate a revolution against
the industrial system. This revolution may or may not make use of violence: it
may be sudden or it may be a relatively gradual process spanning a few decades.
We can't predict any of that. But we do outline in a very general way the
measures that those who hate the industrial system should take in order to
prepare the way for a revolution against that form of society. This is not to
be a POLITICAL revolution. Its object will be to overthrow not governments but
the economic and technological basis of the present society.
5. In this article we give attention to only
some of the negative developments that have grown out of the
industrial-technological system. Other such developments we mention only
briefly or ignore altogether. This does not mean that we regard these other
developments as unimportant. For practical reasons we have to confine our
discussion to areas that have received insufficient public attention or in
which we have something new to say. For example, since there are well-developed
environmental and wilderness movements, we have written very little about
environmental degradation or the destruction of wild nature, even though we
consider these to be highly important.
6. Almost everyone will agree that we live in
a deeply troubled society. One of the most widespread manifestations of the
craziness of our world is leftism, so a discussion of the psychology of leftism
can serve as an introduction to the discussion of the problems of modern
society in general.
7. But what is leftism? During the first half
of the 20th century leftism could have been practically identified with
socialism. Today the movement is fragmented and it is not clear who can
properly be called a leftist. When we speak of leftists in this article we have
in mind mainly socialists, collectivists, "politically correct"
types, feminists, gay and disability activists, animal rights activists and the
like. But not everyone who is associated with one of these movements is a
leftist. What we are trying to get at in discussing leftism is not so much a
movement or an ideology as a psychological type, or rather a collection of
related types. Thus, what we mean by "leftism" will emerge more clearly
in the course of our discussion of leftist psychology (Also, see paragraphs
227-230.)
8. Even so, our conception of leftism will
remain a good deal less clear than we would wish, but there doesn't seem to be
any remedy for this. All we are trying to do is indicate in a rough and
approximate way the two psychological tendencies that we believe are the main
driving force of modern leftism. We by no means claim to be telling the WHOLE
truth about leftist psychology. Also, our discussion is meant to apply to
modern leftism only. We leave open the question of the extent to which our
discussion could be applied to the leftists of the 19th and early 20th century.
9. The two psychological tendencies that
underlie modern leftism we call "feelings of inferiority" and
"oversocialization." Feelings of inferiority are characteristic of
modern leftism as a whole, while oversocialization is characteristic only of a
certain segment of modern leftism; but this segment is highly influential.
10. By "feelings of inferiority" we
mean not only inferiority feelings in the strictest sense but a whole spectrum
of related traits: low self-esteem, feelings of powerlessness, depressive
tendencies, defeatism, guilt, self-hatred, etc. We argue that modern leftists
tend to have such feelings (possibly more or less repressed) and that these
feelings are decisive in determining the direction of modern leftism.
11. When someone interprets as derogatory
almost anything that is said about him (or about groups with whom he identifies)
we conclude that he has inferiority feelings or low self-esteem. This tendency
is pronounced among minority rights advocates, whether or not they belong to
the minority groups whose rights they defend. They are hypersensitive about the
words used to designate minorities. The terms "negro,"
"oriental," "handicapped" or "chick" for an
African, an Asian, a disabled person or a woman originally had no derogatory
connotation. "Broad" and "chick" were merely the feminine
equivalents of "guy," "dude" or "fellow." The
negative connotations have been attached to these terms by the activists
themselves. Some animal rights advocates have gone so far as to reject the word
"pet" and insist on its replacement by "animal companion."
Leftist anthropologists go to great lengths to avoid saying anything about
primitive peoples that could conceivably be interpreted as negative. They want
to replace the word "primitive" by "nonliterate." They seem
almost paranoid about anything that might suggest that any primitive culture is
inferior to our own. (We do not mean to imply that primitive cultures ARE
inferior to ours. We merely point out the hypersensitivity of leftish
anthropologists.)
12. Those who are most sensitive about
"politically incorrect" terminology are not the average black
ghetto-dweller, Asian immigrant, abused woman or disabled person, but a
minority of activists, many of whom do not even belong to any
"oppressed" group but come from privileged strata of society.
Political correctness has its stronghold among university professors, who have
secure employment with comfortable salaries, and the majority of whom are
heterosexual, white males from middle-class families.
13. Many leftists have an intense
identification with the problems of groups that have an image of being weak
(women), defeated (American Indians), repellent (homosexuals), or otherwise
inferior. The leftists themselves feel that these groups are inferior. They
would never admit it to themselves that they have such feelings, but it is
precisely because they do see these groups as inferior that they identify with
their problems. (We do not suggest that women, Indians, etc., ARE inferior; we
are only making a point about leftist psychology).
14. Feminists are desperately anxious to
prove that women are as strong as capable as men. Clearly they are nagged by a
fear that women may NOT be as strong and as capable as men.
15. Leftists tend to hate anything that has
an image of being strong, good and successful. They hate
16. Words like "self-confidence,"
"self-reliance," "initiative", "enterprise,"
"optimism," etc. play little role in the liberal and leftist
vocabulary. The leftist is anti-individualistic, pro-collectivist. He wants
society to solve everyone's needs for them, take care of them. He is not the
sort of person who has an inner sense of confidence in his own ability to solve
his own problems and satisfy his own needs. The leftist is antagonistic to the
concept of competition because, deep inside, he feels like a loser.
17. Art forms that appeal to modern leftist
intellectuals tend to focus on sordidness, defeat and despair, or else they
take an orgiastic tone, throwing off rational control as if there were no hope
of accomplishing anything through rational calculation and all that was left
was to immerse oneself in the sensations of the moment.
18. Modern leftist philosophers tend to
dismiss reason, science, objective reality and to insist that everything is
culturally relative. It is true that one can ask serious questions about the
foundations of scientific knowledge and about how, if at all, the concept of
objective reality can be defined. But it is obvious that modern leftist
philosophers are not simply cool-headed logicians systematically analyzing the
foundations of knowledge. They are deeply involved emotionally in their attack
on truth and reality. They attack these concepts because of their own
psychological needs. For one thing, their attack is an outlet for hostility,
and, to the extent that it is successful, it satisfies the drive for power.
More importantly, the leftist hates science and rationality because they
classify certain beliefs as true (i.e., successful, superior) and other beliefs
as false (i.e. failed, inferior). The leftist's feelings of inferiority run so
deep that he cannot tolerate any classification of some things as successful or
superior and other things as failed or inferior. This also underlies the
rejection by many leftists of the concept of mental illness and of the utility
of IQ tests. Leftists are antagonistic to genetic explanations of human
abilities or behavior because such explanations tend to make some persons
appear superior or inferior to others. Leftists prefer to give society the
credit or blame for an individual's ability or lack of it. Thus if a person is
"inferior" it is not his fault, but society's, because he has not
been brought up properly.
19. The leftist is not typically the kind of
person whose feelings of inferiority make him a braggart, an egotist, a bully,
a self-promoter, a ruthless competitor. This kind of person has not wholly lost
faith in himself. He has a deficit in his sense of power and self-worth, but he
can still conceive of himself as having the capacity to be strong, and his
efforts to make himself strong produce his unpleasant behavior. [1] But the
leftist is too far gone for that. His feelings of inferiority are so ingrained
that he cannot conceive of himself as individually strong and valuable. Hence
the collectivism of the leftist. He can feel strong only as a member of a large
organization or a mass movement with which he identifies himself.
20. Notice the masochistic tendency of
leftist tactics. Leftists protest by lying down in front of vehicles, they
intentionally provoke police or racists to abuse them, etc. These tactics may
often be effective, but many leftists use them not as a means to an end but
because they PREFER masochistic tactics. Self-hatred is a leftist trait.
21. Leftists may claim that their activism is
motivated by compassion or by moral principle, and moral principle does play a
role for the leftist of the oversocialized type. But compassion and moral
principle cannot be the main motives for leftist activism. Hostility is too
prominent a component of leftist behavior; so is the drive for power. Moreover,
much leftist behavior is not rationally calculated to be of benefit to the
people whom the leftists claim to be trying to help. For example, if one
believes that affirmative action is good for black people, does it make sense
to demand affirmative action in hostile or dogmatic terms? Obviously it would
be more productive to take a diplomatic and conciliatory approach that would
make at least verbal and symbolic concessions to white people who think that
affirmative action discriminates against them. But leftist activists do not
take such an approach because it would not satisfy their emotional needs.
Helping black people is not their real goal. Instead, race problems serve as an
excuse for them to express their own hostility and frustrated need for power.
In doing so they actually harm black people, because the activists' hostile
attitude toward the white majority tends to intensify race hatred.
22. If our society had no social problems at
all, the leftists would have to INVENT problems in order to provide themselves
with an excuse for making a fuss.
23. We emphasize that the foregoing does not
pretend to be an accurate description of everyone who might be considered a
leftist. It is only a rough indication of a general tendency of leftism.
24. Psychologists use the term
"socialization" to designate the process by which children are
trained to think and act as society demands. A person is said to be well
socialized if he believes in and obeys the moral code of his society and fits
in well as a functioning part of that society. It may seem senseless to say
that many leftists are over-socialized, since the leftist is perceived as a
rebel. Nevertheless, the position can be defended. Many leftists are not such
rebels as they seem.
them. In order to avoid feelings of guilt,
they continually have to deceive themselves about their own motives and find
moral explanations for feelings and actions that in reality have a non-moral
origin. We use the term "oversocialized" to describe such people. [2]
26. Oversocialization can lead to low
self-esteem, a sense of powerlessness, defeatism, guilt, etc. One of the most
important means by which our society socializes children is by making them feel
ashamed of behavior or speech that is contrary to society's expectations. If
this is overdone, or if a particular child is especially susceptible to such
feelings, he ends by feeling ashamed of HIMSELF. Moreover the thought and the
behavior of the oversocialized person are more restricted by society's
expectations than are those of the lightly socialized person. The majority of
people engage in a significant amount of naughty behavior. They lie, they
commit petty thefts, they break traffic laws, they goof off at work, they hate
someone, they say spiteful things or they use some underhanded trick to get
ahead of the other guy. The oversocialized person cannot do these things, or if
he does do them he generates in himself a sense of shame and self-hatred. The
oversocialized person cannot even experience, without guilt, thoughts or
feelings that are contrary to the accepted morality; he cannot think
"unclean" thoughts. And socialization is not just a matter of morality;
we are socialized to confirm to many norms of behavior that do not fall under
the heading of morality. Thus the oversocialized person is kept on a
psychological leash and spends his life running on rails that society has laid
down for him. In many oversocialized people this results in a sense of
constraint and powerlessness that can be a severe hardship. We suggest that
oversocialization is among the more serious cruelties that human beings inflict
on one another.
27. We argue that a very important and
influential segment of the modern left is oversocialized and that their
oversocialization is of great importance in determining the direction of modern
leftism. Leftists of the oversocialized type tend to be intellectuals or
members of the upper-middle class. Notice that university intellectuals (3)
constitute the most highly socialized segment of our society and also the most
left-wing segment.
28. The leftist of the oversocialized type
tries to get off his psychological leash and assert his autonomy by rebelling.
But usually he is not strong enough to rebel against the most basic values of
society. Generally speaking, the goals of today's leftists are NOT in conflict
with the accepted morality. On the contrary, the left takes an accepted moral
principle, adopts it as its own, and then accuses mainstream society of
violating that principle. Examples: racial equality, equality of the sexes,
helping poor people, peace as opposed to war, nonviolence generally, freedom of
expression, kindness to animals. More fundamentally, the duty of the individual
to serve society and the duty of society to take care of the individual. All
these have been deeply rooted values of our society (or at least of its middle
and upper classes (4) for a long time. These values are explicitly or
implicitly expressed or presupposed in most of the material presented to us by
the mainstream communications media and the educational system. Leftists,
especially those of the oversocialized type, usually do not rebel against these
principles but justify their hostility to society by claiming (with some degree
of truth) that society is not living up to these principles.
29. Here is an illustration of the way in
which the oversocialized leftist shows his real attachment to the conventional
attitudes of our society while pretending to be in rebellion against it. Many
leftists push for affirmative action, for moving black people into
high-prestige jobs, for improved education in black schools and more money for
such schools; the way of life of the black "underclass" they regard
as a social disgrace. They want to integrate the black man into the system,
make him a business executive, a lawyer, a scientist just like
upper-middle-class white people. The leftists will reply that the last thing
they want is to make the black man into a copy of the white man; instead, they
want to preserve African American culture. But in what does this preservation
of African American culture consist? It can hardly consist in anything more
than eating black-style food, listening to black-style music, wearing
black-style clothing and going to a black-style church or mosque. In other
words, it can express itself only in superficial matters. In all ESSENTIAL
respects more leftists of the oversocialized type want to make the black man
conform to white, middle-class ideals. They want to make him study technical
subjects, become an executive or a scientist, spend his life climbing the
status ladder to prove that black people are as good as white. They want to
make black fathers "responsible." they want black gangs to become
nonviolent, etc. But these are exactly the values of the
industrial-technological system. The system couldn't care less what kind of
music a man listens to, what kind of clothes he wears or what religion he
believes in as long as he studies in school, holds a respectable job, climbs
the status ladder, is a "responsible" parent, is nonviolent and so
forth. In effect, however much he may deny it, the oversocialized leftist wants
to integrate the black man into the system and make him adopt its values.
30. We certainly do not claim that leftists,
even of the oversocialized type, NEVER rebel against the fundamental values of
our society. Clearly they sometimes do. Some oversocialized leftists have gone
so far as to rebel against one of modern society's most important principles by
engaging in physical violence. By their own account, violence is for them a
form of "liberation." In other words, by committing violence they
break through the psychological restraints that have been trained into them.
Because they are oversocialized these restraints have been more confining for
them than for others; hence their need to break free of them. But they usually
justify their rebellion in terms of mainstream values. If they engage in
violence they claim to be fighting against racism or the like.
31. We realize that many objections could be
raised to the foregoing thumb-nail sketch of leftist psychology. The real
situation is complex, and anything like a complete description of it would take
several volumes even if the necessary data were available. We claim only to
have indicated very roughly the two most important tendencies in the psychology
of modern leftism.
32. The problems of the leftist are
indicative of the problems of our society as a whole. Low self-esteem,
depressive tendencies and defeatism are not restricted to the left. Though they
are especially noticeable in the left, they are widespread in our society. And
today's society tries to socialize us to a greater extent than any previous
society. We are even told by experts how to eat, how to exercise, how to make
love, how to raise our kids and so forth.
33. Human beings have a need (probably based
in biology) for something that we will call the "power process." This
is closely related to the need for power (which is widely recognized) but is
not quite the same thing. The power process has four elements. The three most
clear-cut of these we call goal, effort and attainment of goal. (Everyone needs
to have goals whose attainment requires effort, and needs to succeed in
attaining at least some of his goals.) The fourth element is more difficult to
define and may not be necessary for everyone. We call it autonomy and will
discuss it later (paragraphs 42-44).
34. Consider the hypothetical case of a man
who can have anything he wants just by wishing for it. Such a man has power,
but he will develop serious psychological problems. At first he will have a lot
of fun, but by and by he will become acutely bored and demoralized. Eventually
he may become clinically depressed. History shows that leisured aristocracies
tend to become decadent. This is not true of fighting aristocracies that have
to struggle to maintain their power. But leisured, secure aristocracies that
have no need to exert themselves usually become bored, hedonistic and
demoralized, even though they have power. This shows that power is not enough.
One must have goals toward which to exercise one's power.
35. Everyone has goals; if nothing else, to
obtain the physical necessities of life: food, water and whatever clothing and
shelter are made necessary by the climate. But the leisured aristocrat obtains
these things without effort. Hence his boredom and demoralization.
36. Nonattainment of important goals results
in death if the goals are physical necessities, and in frustration if
nonattainment of the goals is compatible with survival. Consistent failure to
attain goals throughout life results in defeatism, low self-esteem or
depression.
37. Thus, in order to avoid serious
psychological problems, a human being needs goals whose attainment requires
effort, and he must have a reasonable rate of success in attaining his goals.
38. But not every leisured aristocrat becomes
bored and demoralized. For example, the emperor Hirohito, instead of sinking
into decadent hedonism, devoted himself to marine biology, a field in which he
became distinguished. When people do not have to exert themselves to satisfy
their physical needs they often set up artificial goals for themselves. In many
cases they then pursue these goals with the same energy and emotional
involvement that they otherwise would have put into the search for physical
necessities. Thus the aristocrats of the
39. We use the term "surrogate
activity" to designate an activity that is directed toward an artificial
goal that people set up for themselves merely in order to have some goal to
work toward, or let us say, merely for the sake of the "fulfillment"
that they get from pursuing the goal. Here is a rule of thumb for the
identification of surrogate activities. Given a person who devotes much time
and energy to the pursuit of goal X, ask yourself this: If he had to devote
most of his time and energy to satisfying his biological needs, and if that
effort required him to use his physical and mental facilities in a varied and
interesting way, would he feel seriously deprived because he did not attain
goal X? If the answer is no, then the person's pursuit of a goal X is a
surrogate activity. Hirohito's studies in marine biology clearly constituted a
surrogate activity, since it is pretty certain that if Hirohito had had to
spend his time working at interesting non-scientific tasks in order to obtain
the necessities of life, he would not have felt deprived because he didn't know
all about the anatomy and life-cycles of marine animals. On the other hand the
pursuit of sex and love (for example) is not a surrogate activity, because most
people, even if their existence were otherwise satisfactory, would feel
deprived if they passed their lives without ever having a relationship with a
member of the opposite sex. (But pursuit of an excessive amount of sex, more
than one really needs, can be a surrogate activity.)
40. In modern industrial society only minimal
effort is necessary to satisfy one's physical needs. It is enough to go through
a training program to acquire some petty technical skill, then come to work on
time and exert very modest effort needed to hold a job. The only requirements
are a moderate amount of intelligence, and most of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If
one has those, society takes care of one from cradle to grave. (Yes, there is
an underclass that cannot take physical necessities for granted, but we are
speaking here of mainstream society.) Thus it is not surprising that modern
society is full of surrogate activities. These include scientific work,
athletic achievement, humanitarian work, artistic and literary creation,
climbing the corporate ladder, acquisition of money and material goods far
beyond the point at which they cease to give any additional physical
satisfaction, and social activism when it addresses issues that are not
important for the activist personally, as in the case of white activists who
work for the rights of nonwhite minorities. These are not always pure surrogate
activities, since for many people they may be motivated in part by needs other
than the need to have some goal to pursue. Scientific work may be motivated in
part by a drive for prestige, artistic creation by a need to express feelings,
militant social activism by hostility. But for most people who pursue them,
these activities are in large part surrogate activities. For example, the
majority of scientists will probably agree that the "fulfillment"
they get from their work is more important than the money and prestige they
earn.
41. For many if not most people, surrogate
activities are less satisfying than the pursuit of real goals ( that is, goals
that people would want to attain even if their need for the power process were
already fulfilled). One indication of this is the fact that, in many or most
cases, people who are deeply involved in surrogate activities are never satisfied,
never at rest. Thus the money-maker constantly strives for more and more
wealth. The scientist no sooner solves one problem than he moves on to the
next. The long-distance runner drives himself to run always farther and faster.
Many people who pursue surrogate activities will say that they get far more
fulfillment from these activities than they do from the "mundane"
business of satisfying their biological needs, but that it is because in our
society the effort needed to satisfy the biological needs has been reduced to
triviality. More importantly, in our society people do not satisfy their
biological needs AUTONOMOUSLY but by functioning as parts of an immense social
machine. In contrast, people generally have a great deal of autonomy in
pursuing their surrogate activities.
42. Autonomy as a part of the power process
may not be necessary for every individual. But most people need a greater or
lesser degree of autonomy in working toward their goals. Their efforts must be
undertaken on their own initiative and must be under their own direction and
control. Yet most people do not have to exert this initiative, direction and
control as single individuals. It is usually enough to act as a member of a
SMALL group. Thus if half a dozen people discuss a goal among themselves and
make a successful joint effort to attain that goal, their need for the power
process will be served. But if they work under rigid orders handed down from
above that leave them no room for autonomous decision and initiative, then their
need for the power process will not be served. The same is true when decisions
are made on a collective bases if the group making the collective decision is
so large that the role of each individual is insignificant [5]
43. It is true that some individuals seem to
have little need for autonomy. Either their drive for power is weak or they
satisfy it by identifying themselves with some powerful organization to which
they belong. And then there are unthinking, animal types who seem to be
satisfied with a purely physical sense of power(the good combat soldier, who
gets his sense of power by developing fighting skills that he is quite content
to use in blind obedience to his superiors).
44. But for most people it is through the
power process-having a goal, making an AUTONOMOUS effort and attaining t the
goal-that self-esteem, self-confidence and a sense of power are acquired. When
one does not have adequate opportunity to go throughout the power process the
consequences are (depending on the individual and on the way the power process
is disrupted) boredom, demoralization, low self-esteem, inferiority feelings,
defeatism, depression, anxiety, guilt, frustration, hostility, spouse or child
abuse, insatiable hedonism, abnormal sexual behavior, sleep disorders, eating
disorders, etc. [6]
45. Any of the foregoing symptoms can occur
in any society, but in modern industrial society they are present on a massive
scale. We aren't the first to mention that the world today seems to be going
crazy. This sort of thing is not normal for human societies. There is good
reason to believe that primitive man suffered from less stress and frustration
and was better satisfied with his way of life than modern man is. It is true
that not all was sweetness and light in primitive societies. Abuse of women and
common among the Australian aborigines, transexuality was fairly common among
some of the American Indian tribes. But is does appear that GENERALLY SPEAKING
the kinds of problems that we have listed in the preceding paragraph were far
less common among primitive peoples than they are in modern society.
46. We attribute the social and psychological
problems of modern society to the fact that that society requires people to
live under conditions radically different from those under which the human race
evolved and to behave in ways that conflict with the patterns of behavior that
the human race developed while living under the earlier conditions. It is clear
from what we have already written that we consider lack of opportunity to
properly experience the power process as the most important of the abnormal
conditions to which modern society subjects people. But it is not the only one.
Before dealing with disruption of the power process as a source of social
problems we will discuss some of the other sources.
47. Among the abnormal conditions present in
modern industrial society are excessive density of population, isolation of man
from nature, excessive rapidity of social change and the break-down of natural
small-scale communities such as the extended family, the village or the tribe.
48. It is well known that crowding increases
stress and aggression. The degree of crowding that exists today and the
isolation of man from nature are consequences of technological progress. All
pre-industrial societies were predominantly rural. The industrial Revolution
vastly increased the size of cities and the proportion of the population that
lives in them, and modern agricultural technology has made it possible for the
Earth to support a far denser population than it ever did before. (Also,
technology exacerbates the effects of crowding because it puts increased
disruptive powers in people's hands. For example, a variety of noise-making
devices: power mowers, radios, motorcycles, etc. If the use of these devices is
unrestricted, people who want peace and quiet are frustrated by the noise. If
their use is restricted, people who use the devices are frustrated by the
regulations... But if these machines had never been invented there would have
been no conflict and no frustration generated by them.)
49. For primitive societies the natural world
(which usually changes only slowly) provided a stable framework and therefore a
sense of security. In the modern world it is human society that dominates
nature rather than the other way around, and modern society changes very
rapidly owing to technological change. Thus there is no stable framework.
50. The conservatives are fools: They whine
about the decay of traditional values, yet they enthusiastically support
technological progress and economic growth. Apparently it never occurs to them
that you can't make rapid, drastic changes in the technology and the economy of
a society with out causing rapid changes in all other aspects of the society as
well, and that such rapid changes inevitably break down traditional values.
51.The breakdown of traditional values to
some extent implies the breakdown of the bonds that hold together traditional
small-scale social groups. The disintegration of small-scale social groups is
also promoted by the fact that modern conditions often require or tempt
individuals to move to new locations, separating themselves from their
communities. Beyond that, a technological society HAS TO weaken family ties and
local communities if it is to function efficiently. In modern society an
individual's loyalty must be first to the system and only secondarily to a
small-scale community, because if the internal loyalties of small-scale
small-scale communities were stronger than loyalty to the system, such
communities would pursue their own advantage at the expense of the system.
52. Suppose that a public official or a
corporation executive appoints his cousin, his friend or his co-religionist to
a position rather than appointing the person best qualified for the job. He has
permitted personal loyalty to supersede his loyalty to the system, and that is
"nepotism" or "discrimination," both of which are terrible
sins in modern society. Would-be industrial societies that have done a poor job
of subordinating personal or local loyalties to loyalty to the system are
usually very inefficient. (Look at
53. Crowding, rapid change and the breakdown
of communities have been widely recognized as sources of social problems. but
we do not believe they are enough to account for the extent of the problems
that are seen today.
54. A few pre-industrial cities were very
large and crowded, yet their inhabitants do not seem to have suffered from
psychological problems to the same extent as modern man. In
55. On the growing edge of the American
frontier during the 19th century, the mobility of the population probably broke
down extended families and small-scale social groups to at least the same
extent as these are broken down today. In fact, many nuclear families lived by
choice in such isolation, having no neighbors within several miles, that they
belonged to no community at all, yet they do not seem to have developed
problems as a result.
56.Furthermore, change in American frontier
society was very rapid and deep. A man might be born and raised in a log cabin,
outside the reach of law and order and fed largely on wild meat; and by the
time he arrived at old age he might be working at a regular job and living in
an ordered community with effective law enforcement. This was a deeper change
that that which typically occurs in the life of a modern individual, yet it
does not seem to have led to psychological problems. In fact, 19th century
American society had an optimistic and self-confident tone, quite unlike that
of today's society. [8]
57. The difference, we argue, is that modern
man has the sense (largely justified) that change is IMPOSED on him, whereas
the 19th century frontiersman had the sense (also largely justified) that he
created change himself, by his own choice. Thus a pioneer settled on a piece of
land of his own choosing and made it into a farm through his own effort. In
those days an entire county might have only a couple of hundred inhabitants and
was a far more isolated and autonomous entity than a modern county is. Hence
the pioneer farmer participated as a member of a relatively small group in the
creation of a new, ordered community. One may well question whether the
creation of this community was an improvement, but at any rate it satisfied the
pioneer's need for the power process.
58. It would be possible to give other
examples of societies in which there has been rapid change and/or lack of close
community ties without he kind of massive behavioral aberration that is seen in
today's industrial society. We contend that the most important cause of social
and psychological problems in modern society is the fact that people have
insufficient opportunity to go through the power process in a normal way. We
don't mean to say that modern society is the only one in which the power
process has been disrupted. Probably most if not all civilized societies have
interfered with the power ' process to a greater or lesser extent. But in
modern industrial society the problem has become particularly acute. Leftism,
at least in its recent (mid-to-late -20th century) form, is in part a symptom
of deprivation with respect to the power process.
59. We divide human drives into three groups:
(1) those drives that can be satisfied with minimal effort; (2) those that can
be satisfied but only at the cost of serious effort; (3) those that cannot be
adequately satisfied no matter how much effort one makes. The power process is
the process of satisfying the drives of the second group. The more drives there
are in the third group, the more there is frustration, anger, eventually
defeatism, depression, etc.
60. In modern industrial society natural
human drives tend to be pushed into the first and third groups, and the second
group tends to consist increasingly of artificially created drives.
61. In primitive societies, physical
necessities generally fall into group 2: They can be obtained, but only at the
cost of serious effort. But modern society tends to guaranty the physical
necessities to everyone [9] in exchange for only minimal effort, hence physical
needs are pushed into group 1. (There may be disagreement about whether the
effort needed to hold a job is "minimal"; but usually, in lower- to
middle-level jobs, whatever effort is required is merely that of obedience. You
sit or stand where you are told to sit or stand and do what you are told to do
in the way you are told to do it. Seldom do you have to exert yourself
seriously, and in any case you have hardly any autonomy in work, so that the
need for the power process is not well served.)
62. Social needs, such as sex, love and
status, often remain in group 2 in modern society, depending on the situation
of the individual. [10] But, except for people who have a particularly strong
drive for status, the effort required to fulfill the social drives is
insufficient to satisfy adequately the need for the power process.
63. So certain artificial needs have been
created that fall into group 2, hence serve the need for the power process.
Advertising and marketing techniques have been developed that make many people
feel they need things that their grandparents never desired or even dreamed of.
It requires serious effort to earn enough money to satisfy these artificial
needs, hence they fall into group 2. (But see paragraphs 80-82.) Modern man
must satisfy his need for the power process largely through pursuit of the
artificial needs created by the advertising and marketing industry [11], and
through surrogate activities.
64. It seems that for many people, maybe the
majority, these artificial forms of the power process are insufficient. A theme
that appears repeatedly in the writings of the social critics of the second
half of the 20th century is the sense of purposelessness that afflicts many
people in modern society. (This purposelessness is often called by other names
such as "anomic" or "middle-class vacuity.") We suggest
that the so-called "identity crisis" is actually a search for a sense
of purpose, often for commitment to a suitable surrogate activity. It may be
that existentialism is in large part a response to the purposelessness of
modern life. [12] Very widespread in modern society is the search for
"fulfillment." But we think that for the majority of people an
activity whose main goal is fulfillment (that is, a surrogate activity) does
not bring completely satisfactory fulfillment. In other words, it does not
fully satisfy the need for the power process. (See paragraph 41.) That need can
be fully satisfied only through activities that have some external goal, such
as physical necessities, sex, love, status, revenge, etc.
65. Moreover, where goals are pursued through
earning money, climbing the status ladder or functioning as part of the system
in some other way, most people are not in a position to pursue their goals
AUTONOMOUSLY. Most workers are someone else's employee as, as we pointed out in
paragraph 61, must spend their days doing what they are told to do in the way
they are told to do it. Even most people who are in business for themselves
have only limited autonomy. It is a chronic complaint of small-business persons
and entrepreneurs that their hands are tied by excessive government regulation.
Some of these regulations are doubtless unnecessary, but for the most part
government regulations are essential and inevitable parts of our extremely
complex society. A large portion of small business today operates on the
franchise system. It was reported in the Wall Street Journal a few years ago
that many of the franchise-granting companies require applicants for franchises
to take a personality test that is designed to EXCLUDE those who have
creativity and initiative, because such persons are not sufficiently docile to
go along obediently with the franchise system. This excludes from small
business many of the people who most need autonomy.
66. Today people live more by virtue of what
the system does FOR them or TO them than by virtue of what they do for
themselves. And what they do for themselves is done more and more along
channels laid down by the system. Opportunities tend to be those that the
system provides, the opportunities must be exploited in accord with the rules
and regulations [13], and techniques prescribed by experts must be followed if
there is to be a chance of success.
67. Thus the power process is disrupted in
our society through a deficiency of real goals and a deficiency of autonomy in
pursuit of goals. But it is also disrupted because of those human drives that
fall into group 3: the drives that one cannot adequately satisfy no matter how
much effort one makes. One of these drives is the need for security. Our lives
depend on decisions made by other people; we have no control over these
decisions and usually we do not even know the people who make them. ("We
live in a world in which relatively few people - maybe 500 or 1,00 - make the
important decisions" - Philip B. Heymann of Harvard Law School, quoted by
Anthony Lewis, New York Times, April 21, 1995.) Our lives depend on whether
safety standards at a nuclear power plant are properly maintained; on how much
pesticide is allowed to get into our food or how much pollution into our air;
on how skillful (or incompetent) our doctor is; whether we lose or get a job
may depend on decisions made by government economists or corporation
executives; and so forth. Most individuals are not in a position to secure themselves
against these threats to more [than] a very limited extent. The individual's
search for security is therefore frustrated, which leads to a sense of
powerlessness.
68. It may be objected that primitive man is
physically less secure than modern man, as is shown by his shorter life
expectancy; hence modern man suffers from less, not more than the amount of
insecurity that is normal for human beings. but psychological security does not
closely correspond with physical security. What makes us FEEL secure is not so
much objective security as a sense of confidence in our ability to take care of
ourselves. Primitive man, threatened by a fierce animal or by hunger, can fight
in self-defense or travel in search of food. He has no certainty of success in
these efforts, but he is by no means helpless against the things that threaten
him. The modern individual on the other hand is threatened by many things
against which he is helpless; nuclear accidents, carcinogens in food,
environmental pollution, war, increasing taxes, invasion of his privacy by
large organizations, nation-wide social or economic phenomena that may disrupt
his way of life.
69. It is true that primitive man is
powerless against some of the things that threaten him; disease for example.
But he can accept the risk of disease stoically. It is part of the nature of
things, it is no one's fault, unless is the fault of some imaginary, impersonal
demon. But threats to the modern individual tend to be MAN-MADE. They are not
the results of chance but are IMPOSED on him by other persons whose decisions
he, as an individual, is unable to influence. Consequently he feels frustrated,
humiliated and angry.
70. Thus primitive man for the most part has
his security in his own hands (either as an individual or as a member of a
SMALL group) whereas the security of modern man is in the hands of persons or
organizations that are too remote or too large for him to be able personally to
influence them. So modern man's drive for security tends to fall into groups 1
and 3; in some areas (food, shelter, etc.) his security is assured at the cost
of only trivial effort, whereas in other areas he CANNOT attain security. (The
foregoing greatly simplifies the real situation, but it does indicate in a
rough, general way how the condition of modern man differs from that of
primitive man.)
71. People have many transitory drives or
impulses that are necessary frustrated in modern life, hence fall into group 3.
One may become angry, but modern society cannot permit fighting. In many
situations it does not even permit verbal aggression. When going somewhere one
may be in a hurry, or one may be in a mood to travel slowly, but one generally
has no choice but to move with the flow of traffic and obey the traffic
signals. One may want to do one's work in a different way, but usually one can
work only according to the rules laid down by one's employer. In many other
ways as well, modern man is strapped down by a network of rules and regulations
(explicit or implicit) that frustrate many of his impulses and thus interfere
with the power process. Most of these regulations cannot be disposed with,
because the are necessary for the functioning of industrial society.
72. Modern society is in certain respects
extremely permissive. In matters that are irrelevant to the functioning of the
system we can generally do what we please. We can believe in any religion we
like (as long as it does not encourage behavior that is dangerous to the
system). We can go to bed with anyone we like (as long as we practice
"safe sex"). We can do anything we like as long as it is UNIMPORTANT.
But in all IMPORTANT matters the system tends increasingly to regulate our
behavior.
73. Behavior is regulated not only through
explicit rules and not only by the government. Control is often exercised
through indirect coercion or through psychological pressure or manipulation,
and by organizations other than the government, or by the system as a whole.
Most large organizations use some form of propaganda [14] to manipulate public
attitudes or behavior. Propaganda is not limited to "commercials" and
advertisements, and sometimes it is not even consciously intended as propaganda
by the people who make it. For instance, the content of entertainment
programming is a powerful form of propaganda. An example of indirect coercion:
There is no law that says we have to go to work every day and follow our
employer's orders. Legally there is nothing to prevent us from going to live in
the wild like primitive people or from going into business for ourselves. But
in practice there is very little wild country left, and there is room in the
economy for only a limited number of small business owners. Hence most of us
can survive only as someone else's employee.
74. We suggest that modern man's obsession
with longevity, and with maintaining physical vigor and sexual attractiveness
to an advanced age, is a symptom of unfulfillment resulting from deprivation
with respect to the power process. The "mid-life crisis" also is such
a symptom. So is the lack of interest in having children that is fairly common
in modern society but almost unheard-of in primitive societies.
75. In primitive societies life is a
succession of stages. The needs and purposes of one stage having been
fulfilled, there is no particular reluctance about passing on to the next
stage. A young man goes through the power process by becoming a hunter, hunting
not for sport or for fulfillment but to get meat that is necessary for food.
(In young women the process is more complex, with greater emphasis on social
power; we won't discuss that here.) This phase having been successfully passed
through, the young man has no reluctance about settling down to the
responsibilities of raising a family. (In contrast, some modern people
indefinitely postpone having children because they are too busy seeking some
kind of "fulfillment." We suggest that the fulfillment they need is
adequate experience of the power process -- with real goals instead of the
artificial goals of surrogate activities.) Again, having successfully raised
his children, going through the power process by providing them with the
physical necessities, the primitive man feels that his work is done and he is
prepared to accept old age (if he survives that long) and death. Many modern people,
on the other hand, are disturbed by the prospect of death, as is shown by the
amount of effort they expend trying to maintain their physical condition,
appearance and health. We argue that this is due to unfulfillment resulting
from the fact that they have never put their physical powers to any use, have
never gone through the power process using their bodies in a serious way. It is
not the primitive man, who has used his body daily for practical purposes, who
fears the deterioration of age, but the modern man, who has never had a
practical use for his body beyond walking from his car to his house. It is the
man whose need for the power process has been satisfied during his life who is
best prepared to accept the end of that life.
76. In response to the arguments of this
section someone will say, "Society must find a way to give people the
opportunity to go through the power process." For such people the value of
the opportunity is destroyed by the very fact that society gives it to them. What
they need is to find or make their own opportunities. As long as the system
GIVES them their opportunities it still has them on a leash. To attain autonomy
they must get off that leash.
77. Not everyone in industrial-technological
society suffers from psychological problems. Some people even profess to be
quite satisfied with society as it is. We now discuss some of the reasons why
people differ so greatly in their response to modern society.
78. First, there doubtless are differences in
the strength of the drive for power. Individuals with a weak drive for power
may have relatively little need to go through the power process, or at least
relatively little need for autonomy in the power process. These are docile
types who would have been happy as plantation darkies in the Old South. (We
don't mean to sneer at "plantation darkies" of the Old South. To
their credit, most of the slaves were NOT content with their servitude. We do
sneer at people who ARE content with servitude.)
79. Some people may have some exceptional
drive, in pursuing which they satisfy their need for the power process. For
example, those who have an unusually strong drive for social status may spend
their whole lives climbing the status ladder without ever getting bored with that
game.
80. People vary in their susceptibility to
advertising and marketing techniques. Some people are so susceptible that, even
if they make a great deal of money, they cannot satisfy their constant craving
for the shiny new toys that the marketing industry dangles before their eyes.
So they always feel hard-pressed financially even if their income is large, and
their cravings are frustrated.
81. Some people have low susceptibility to
advertising and marketing techniques. These are the people who aren't
interested in money. Material acquisition does not serve their need for the
power process.
82. People who have medium susceptibility to
advertising and marketing techniques are able to earn enough money to satisfy
their craving for goods and services, but only at the cost of serious effort
(putting in overtime, taking a second job, earning promotions, etc.) Thus
material acquisition serves their need for the power process. But it does not
necessarily follow that their need is fully satisfied. They may have
insufficient autonomy in the power process (their work may consist of following
orders) and some of their drives may be frustrated (e.g., security,
aggression). (We are guilty of oversimplification in paragraphs 80-82 because
we have assumed that the desire for material acquisition is entirely a creation
of the advertising and marketing industry. Of course it's not that simple.
83. Some people partly satisfy their need for
power by identifying themselves with a powerful organization or mass movement.
An individual lacking goals or power joins a movement or an organization,
adopts its goals as his own, then works toward these goals. When some of the
goals are attained, the individual, even though his personal efforts have
played only an insignificant part in the attainment of the goals, feels
(through his identification with the movement or organization) as if he had
gone through the power process. This phenomenon was exploited by the fascists,
nazis and communists. Our society uses it, too, though less crudely. Example:
Manuel Noriega was an irritant to the
for building enormous muscles, hitting a
little ball into a hole or acquiring a complete series of postage stamps. Yet
many people in our society devote themselves with passion to bodybuilding, golf
or stamp collecting. Some people are more "other-directed" than
others, and therefore will more readily attack importance to a surrogate
activity simply because the people around them treat it as important or because
society tells them it is important. That is why some people get very serious
about essentially trivial activities such as sports, or bridge, or chess, or
arcane scholarly pursuits, whereas others who are more clear-sighted never see
these things as anything but the surrogate activities that they are, and
consequently never attach enough importance to them to satisfy their need for
the power process in that way. It only remains to point out that in many cases
a person's way of earning a living is also a surrogate activity. Not a PURE
surrogate activity, since part of the motive for the activity is to gain the
physical necessities and (for some people) social status and the luxuries that
advertising makes them want. But many people put into their work far more
effort than is necessary to earn whatever money and status they require, and
this extra effort constitutes a surrogate activity. This extra effort, together
with the emotional investment that accompanies it, is one of the most potent
forces acting toward the continual development and perfecting of the system,
with negative consequences for individual freedom (see paragraph 131).
Especially, for the most creative scientists and engineers, work tends to be largely
a surrogate activity. This point is so important that is deserves a separate
discussion, which we shall give in a moment (paragraphs 87-92).
85. In this section we have explained how
many people in modern society do satisfy their need for the power process to a
greater or lesser extent. But we think that for the majority of people the need
for the power process is not fully satisfied. In the first place, those who
have an insatiable drive for status, or who get firmly "hooked" or a
surrogate activity, or who identify strongly enough with a movement or
organization to satisfy their need for power in that way, are exceptional
personalities. Others are not fully satisfied with surrogate activities or by
identification with an organization (see paragraphs 41, 64). In the second
place, too much control is imposed by the system through explicit regulation or
through socialization, which results in a deficiency of autonomy, and in
frustration due to the impossibility of attaining certain goals and the necessity
of restraining too many impulses.
86. But even if most people in
industrial-technological society were well satisfied, we (FC) would still be
opposed to that form of society, because (among other reasons) we consider it
demeaning to fulfill one's need for the power process through surrogate
activities or through identification with an organization, rather then through
pursuit of real goals.
87. Science and technology provide the most
important examples of surrogate activities. Some scientists claim that they are
motivated by "curiosity," that notion is simply absurd. Most
scientists work on highly specialized problem that are not the object of any
normal curiosity. For example, is an astronomer, a mathematician or an entomologist
curious about the properties of isopropyltrimethylmethane? Of course not. Only
a chemist is curious about such a thing, and he is curious about it only
because chemistry is his surrogate activity. Is the chemist curious about the
appropriate classification of a new species of beetle? No. That question is of
interest only to the entomologist, and he is interested in it only because
entomology is his surrogate activity. If the chemist and the entomologist had
to exert themselves seriously to obtain the physical necessities, and if that
effort exercised their abilities in an interesting way but in some
nonscientific pursuit, then they couldn't giver a damn about
isopropyltrimethylmethane or the classification of beetles. Suppose that lack
of funds for postgraduate education had led the chemist to become an insurance
broker instead of a chemist. In that case he would have been very interested in
insurance matters but would have cared nothing about isopropyltrimethylmethane.
In any case it is not normal to put into the satisfaction of mere curiosity the
amount of time and effort that scientists put into their work. The
"curiosity" explanation for the scientists' motive just doesn't stand
up.
88. The "benefit of humanity"
explanation doesn't work any better. Some scientific work has no conceivable
relation to the welfare of the human race - most of archaeology or comparative
linguistics for example. Some other areas of science present obviously
dangerous possibilities. Yet scientists in these areas are just as enthusiastic
about their work as those who develop vaccines or study air pollution. Consider
the case of Dr. Edward Teller, who had an obvious emotional involvement in
promoting nuclear power plants. Did this involvement stem from a desire to
benefit humanity? If so, then why didn't Dr. Teller get emotional about other
"humanitarian" causes? If he was such a humanitarian then why did he
help to develop the H-bomb? As with many other scientific achievements, it is
very much open to question whether nuclear power plants actually do benefit
humanity. Does the cheap electricity outweigh the accumulating waste and risk
of accidents? Dr. Teller saw only one side of the question. Clearly his
emotional involvement with nuclear power arose not from a desire to "benefit
humanity" but from a personal fulfillment he got from his work and from
seeing it put to practical use.
89. The same is true of scientists generally.
With possible rare exceptions, their motive is neither curiosity nor a desire
to benefit humanity but the need to go through the power process: to have a
goal (a scientific problem to solve), to make an effort (research) and to
attain the goal (solution of the problem.) Science is a surrogate activity
because scientists work mainly for the fulfillment they get out of the work
itself.
90. Of course, it's not that simple. Other
motives do play a role for many scientists. Money and status for example. Some
scientists may be persons of the type who have an insatiable drive for status
(see paragraph 79) and this may provide much of the motivation for their work.
No doubt the majority of scientists, like the majority of the general
population, are more or less susceptible to advertising and marketing
techniques and need money to satisfy their craving for goods and services. Thus
science is not a PURE surrogate activity. But it is in large part a surrogate
activity.
91. Also, science and technology constitute a
mass power movement, and many scientists gratify their need for power through
identification with this mass movement (see paragraph 83).
92. Thus science marches on blindly, without
regard to the real welfare of the human race or to any other standard, obedient
only to the psychological needs of the scientists and of the government
officials and corporation executives who provide the funds for research.
93. We are going to argue that
industrial-technological society cannot be reformed in such a way as to prevent
it from progressively narrowing the sphere of human freedom. But because "freedom"
is a word that can be interpreted in many ways, we must first make clear what
kind of freedom we are concerned with.
94. By "freedom" we mean the
opportunity to go through the power process, with real goals not the artificial
goals of surrogate activities, and without interference, manipulation or
supervision from anyone, especially from any large organization. Freedom means
being in control (either as an individual or as a member of a SMALL group) of
the life-and-death issues of one's existence; food, clothing, shelter and
defense against whatever threats there may be in one's environment. Freedom
means having power; not the power to control other people but the power to
control the circumstances of one's own life. One does not have freedom if anyone
else (especially a large organization) has power over one, no matter how
benevolently, tolerantly and permissively that power may be exercised. It is
important not to confuse freedom with mere permissiveness (see paragraph 72).
95. It is said that we live in a free society
because we have a certain number of constitutionally guaranteed rights. But
these are not as important as they seem. The degree of personal freedom that
exists in a society is determined more by the economic and technological structure
of the society than by its laws or its form of government. [16] Most of the
Indian nations of
96. As for our constitutional rights,
consider for example that of freedom of the press. We certainly don't mean to knock
that right: it is very important tool for limiting concentration of political
power and for keeping those who do have political power in line by publicly
exposing any misbehavior on their part. But freedom of the press is of very
little use to the average citizen as an individual. The mass media are mostly
under the control of large organizations that are integrated into the system.
Anyone who has a little money can have something printed, or can distribute it
on the Internet or in some such way, but what he has to say will be swamped by
the vast volume of material put out by the media, hence it will have no
practical effect. To make an impression on society with words is therefore
almost impossible for most individuals and small groups. Take us (FC) for
example. If we had never done anything violent and had submitted the present
writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been accepted. If they
had been accepted and published, they probably would not have attracted many
readers, because it's more fun to watch the entertainment put out by the media
than to read a sober essay. Even if these writings had had many readers, most
of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read as their minds
were flooded by the mass of material to which the media expose them. In order
to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting
impression, we've had to kill people.
97. Constitutional rights are useful up to a
point, but they do not serve to guarantee much more than what could be called
the bourgeois conception of freedom. According to the bourgeois conception, a
"free" man is essentially an element of a social machine and has only
a certain set of prescribed and delimited freedoms; freedoms that are designed
to serve the needs of the social machine more than those of the individual.
Thus the bourgeois's "free" man has economic freedom because that
promotes growth and progress; he has freedom of the press because public
criticism restrains misbehavior by political leaders; he has a rights to a fair
trial because imprisonment at the whim of the powerful would be bad for the
system. This was clearly the attitude of Simon Bolivar. To him, people deserved
liberty only if they used it to promote progress (progress as conceived by the
bourgeois). Other bourgeois thinkers have taken a similar view of freedom as a
mere means to collective ends. Chester C. Tan, "Chinese Political Thought
in the Twentieth Century," page 202, explains the philosophy of the
Kuomintang leader Hu Han-min: "An individual is granted rights because he
is a member of society and his community life requires such rights. By
community Hu meant the whole society of the nation." And on page 259 Tan
states that according to Carsum Chang (Chang Chun-mai, head of the State
Socialist Party in
98. One more point to be made in this
section: It should not be assumed that a person has enough freedom just because
he SAYS he has enough. Freedom is restricted in part by psychological control
of which people are unconscious, and moreover many people's ideas of what
constitutes freedom are governed more by social convention than by their real
needs. For example, it's likely that many leftists of the oversocialized type
would say that most people, including themselves are socialized too little
rather than too much, yet the oversocialized leftist pays a heavy psychological
price for his high level of socialization.
99. Think of history as being the sum of two
components: an erratic component that consists of unpredictable events that
follow no discernible pattern, and a regular component that consists of
long-term historical trends. Here we are concerned with the long-term trends.
100. FIRST PRINCIPLE. If a SMALL change is
made that affects a long-term historical trend, then the effect of that change
will almost always be transitory - the trend will soon revert to its original
state. (Example: A reform movement designed to clean up political corruption in
a society rarely has more than a short-term effect; sooner or later the
reformers relax and corruption creeps back in. The level of political
corruption in a given society tends to remain constant, or to change only
slowly with the evolution of the society. Normally, a political cleanup will be
permanent only if accompanied by widespread social changes; a SMALL change in
the society won't be enough.) If a small change in a long-term historical trend
appears to be permanent, it is only because the change acts in the direction in
which the trend is already moving, so that the trend is not altered but only
pushed a step ahead.
101. The first principle is almost a
tautology. If a trend were not stable with respect to small changes, it would
wander at random rather than following a definite direction; in other words it
would not be a long-term trend at all.
102. SECOND PRINCIPLE. If a change is made
that is sufficiently large to alter permanently a long-term historical trend,
than it will alter the society as a whole. In other words, a society is a
system in which all parts are interrelated, and you can't permanently change
any important part without change all the other parts as well.
103. THIRD PRINCIPLE. If a change is made
that is large enough to alter permanently a long-term trend, then the
consequences for the society as a whole cannot be predicted in advance. (Unless
various other societies have passed through the same change and have all
experienced the same consequences, in which case one can predict on empirical
grounds that another society that passes through the same change will be like
to experience similar consequences.)
104. FOURTH PRINCIPLE. A new kind of society
cannot be designed on paper. That is, you cannot plan out a new form of society
in advance, then set it up and expect it to function as it was designed to.
105. The third and fourth principles result
from the complexity of human societies. A change in human behavior will affect
the economy of a society and its physical environment; the economy will affect
the environment and vice versa, and the changes in the economy and the
environment will affect human behavior in complex, unpredictable ways; and so
forth. The network of causes and effects is far too complex to be untangled and
understood.
106. FIFTH PRINCIPLE. People do not
consciously and rationally choose the form of their society. Societies develop
through processes of social evolution that are not under rational human
control.
107. The fifth principle is a consequence of
the other four.
108. To illustrate: By the first principle,
generally speaking an attempt at social reform either acts in the direction in
which the society is developing anyway (so that it merely accelerates a change
that would have occurred in any case) or else it only has a transitory effect,
so that the society soon slips back into its old groove. To make a lasting
change in the direction of development of any important aspect of a society,
reform is insufficient and revolution is required. (A revolution does not
necessarily involve an armed uprising or the overthrow of a government.) By the
second principle, a revolution never changes only one aspect of a society; and
by the third principle changes occur that were never expected or desired by the
revolutionaries. By the fourth principle, when revolutionaries or utopians set
up a new kind of society, it never works out as planned.
109. The American Revolution does not provide
a counterexample. The American "Revolution" was not a revolution in
our sense of the word, but a war of independence followed by a rather
far-reaching political reform. The Founding Fathers did not change the
direction of development of American society, nor did they aspire to do so.
They only freed the development of American society from the retarding effect
of British rule. Their political reform did not change any basic trend, but
only pushed American political culture along its natural direction of
development. British society, of which American society was an off-shoot, had
been moving for a long time in the direction of representative democracy. And
prior to the War of Independence the Americans were already practicing a
significant degree of representative democracy in the colonial assemblies. The
political system established by the Constitution was modeled on the British
system and on the colonial assemblies. With major alteration, to be sure -
there is no doubt that the Founding Fathers took a very important step. But it
was a step along the road the English-speaking world was already traveling. The
proof is that
110. Still, one has to use common sense in
applying the principles. They are expressed in imprecise language that allows
latitude for interpretation, and exceptions to them can be found. So we present
these principles not as inviolable laws but as rules of thumb, or guides to
thinking, that may provide a partial antidote to naive ideas about the future
of society. The principles should be borne constantly in mind, and whenever one
reaches a conclusion that conflicts with them one should carefully reexamine
one's thinking and retain the conclusion only if one has good, solid reasons for
doing so.
111. The foregoing principles help to show
how hopelessly difficult it would be to reform the industrial system in such a
way as to prevent it from progressively narrowing our sphere of freedom. There
has been a consistent tendency, going back at least to the Industrial
Revolution for technology to strengthen the system at a high cost in individual
freedom and local autonomy. Hence any change designed to protect freedom from
technology would be contrary to a fundamental trend in the development of our
society.
retracted when their disruptive effects
became apparent. Thus, permanent changes in favor of freedom could be brought
about only by persons prepared to accept radical, dangerous and unpredictable
alteration of the entire system. In other words, by revolutionaries, not
reformers.
112. People anxious to rescue freedom without
sacrificing the supposed benefits of technology will suggest naive schemes for
some new form of society that would reconcile freedom with technology. Apart
from the fact that people who make suggestions seldom propose any practical
means by which the new form of society could be set up in the first place, it
follows from the fourth principle that even if the new form of society could be
once established, it either would collapse or would give results very different
from those expected.
113. So even on very general grounds it seems
highly improbably that any way of changing society could be found that would
reconcile freedom with modern technology. In the next few sections we will give
more specific reasons for concluding that freedom and technological progress
are incompatible.
RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM IS UNAVOIDABLE IN INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY
114. As explained in paragraph 65-67, 70-73,
modern man is strapped down by a network of rules and regulations, and his fate
depends on the actions of persons remote from him whose decisions he cannot
influence. This is not accidental or a result of the arbitrariness of arrogant
bureaucrats. It is necessary and inevitable in any technologically advanced
society. The system HAS TO regulate human behavior closely in order to
function. At work, people have to do what they are told to do, otherwise
production would be thrown into chaos. Bureaucracies HAVE TO be run according
to rigid rules. To allow any substantial personal discretion to lower-level
bureaucrats would disrupt the system and lead to charges of unfairness due to
differences in the way individual bureaucrats exercised their discretion. It is
true that some restrictions on our freedom could be eliminated, but GENERALLY
SPEAKING the regulation of our lives by large organizations is necessary for
the functioning of industrial-technological society. The result is a sense of
powerlessness on the part of the average person. It may be, however, that
formal regulations will tend increasingly to be replaced by psychological tools
that make us want to do what the system requires of us. (Propaganda [14],
educational techniques, "mental health" programs, etc.)
115. The system HAS TO force people to behave
in ways that are increasingly remote from the natural pattern of human
behavior. For example, the system needs scientists, mathematicians and
engineers. It can't function without them. So heavy pressure is put on children
to excel in these fields. It isn't natural for an adolescent human being to
spend the bulk of his time sitting at a desk absorbed in study. A normal
adolescent wants to spend his time in active contact with the real world. Among
primitive peoples the things that children are trained to do are in natural
harmony with natural human impulses. Among the American Indians, for example,
boys were trained in active outdoor pursuits -- just the sort of things that
boys like. But in our society children are pushed into studying technical
subjects, which most do grudgingly.
116. Because of the constant pressure that
the system exerts to modify human behavior, there is a gradual increase in the
number of people who cannot or will not adjust to society's requirements:
welfare leeches, youth-gang members, cultists, anti-government rebels, radical
environmentalist saboteurs, dropouts and resisters of various kinds.
117. In any technologically advanced society
the individual's fate MUST depend on decisions that he personally cannot
influence to any great extent. A technological society cannot be broken down
into small, autonomous communities, because production depends on the
cooperation of very large numbers of people and machines. Such a society MUST
be highly organized and decisions HAVE TO be made that affect very large
numbers of people. When a decision affects, say, a million people, then each of
the affected individuals has, on the average, only a one-millionth share in
making the decision. What usually happens in practice is that decisions are
made by public officials or corporation executives, or by technical
specialists, but even when the public votes on a decision the number of voters
ordinarily is too large for the vote of any one individual to be significant.
[17] Thus most individuals are unable to influence measurably the major
decisions that affect their lives. Their is no conceivable way to remedy this
in a technologically advanced society. The system tries to "solve"
this problem by using propaganda to make people WANT the decisions that have
been made for them, but even if this "solution" were completely
successful in making people feel better, it would be demeaning.
118 Conservatives and some others advocate
more "local autonomy." Local communities once did have autonomy, but
such autonomy becomes less and less possible as local communities become more
enmeshed with and dependent on large-scale systems like public utilities,
computer networks, highway systems, the mass communications media, the modern
health care system. Also operating against autonomy is the fact that technology
applied in one location often affects people at other locations far away. Thus
pesticide or chemical use near a creek may contaminate the water supply
hundreds of miles downstream, and the greenhouse effect affects the whole
world.
119. The system does not and cannot exist to
satisfy human needs. Instead, it is human behavior that has to be modified to
fit the needs of the system. This has nothing to do with the political or
social ideology that may pretend to guide the technological system. It is the
fault of technology, because the system is guided not by ideology but by
technical necessity. [18] Of course the system does satisfy many human needs,
but generally speaking it does this only to the extent that it is to the
advantage of the system to do it. It is the needs of the system that are
paramount, not those of the human being. For example, the system provides
people with food because the system couldn't function if everyone starved; it
attends to people's psychological needs whenever it can CONVENIENTLY do so,
because it couldn't function if too many people became depressed or rebellious.
But the system, for good, solid, practical reasons, must exert constant
pressure on people to mold their behavior to the needs of the system. Too much
waste accumulating? The government, the media, the educational system,
environmentalists, everyone inundates us with a mass of propaganda about
recycling. Need more technical personnel? A chorus of voices exhorts kids to
study science. No one stops to ask whether it is inhumane to force adolescents
to spend the bulk of their time studying subjects most of them hate. When
skilled workers are put out of a job by technical advances and have to undergo
"retraining," no one asks whether it is humiliating for them to be pushed
around in this way. It is simply taken for granted that everyone must bow to
technical necessity and for good reason: If human needs were put before
technical necessity there would be economic problems, unemployment, shortages
or worse. The concept of "mental health" in our society is defined
largely by the extent to which an individual behaves in accord with the needs
of the system and does so without showing signs of stress.
120. Efforts to make room for a sense of
purpose and for autonomy within the system are no better than a joke. For
example, one company, instead of having each of its employees assemble only one
section of a catalogue, had each assemble a whole catalogue, and this was
supposed to give them a sense of purpose and achievement. Some companies have
tried to give their employees more autonomy in their work, but for practical
reasons this usually can be done only to a very limited extent, and in any case
employees are never given autonomy as to ultimate goals -- their
"autonomous" efforts can never be directed toward goals that they
select personally, but only toward their employer's goals, such as the survival
and growth of the company. Any company would soon go out of business if it
permitted its employees to act otherwise. Similarly, in any enterprise within a
socialist system, workers must direct their efforts toward the goals of the
enterprise, otherwise the enterprise will not serve its purpose as part of the
system. Once again, for purely technical reasons it is not possible for most
individuals or small groups to have much autonomy in industrial society. Even
the small-business owner commonly has only limited autonomy. Apart from the
necessity of government regulation, he is restricted by the fact that he must
fit into the economic system and conform to its requirements. For instance,
when someone develops a new technology, the small-business person often has to
use that technology whether he wants to or not, in order to remain competitive.
THE 'BAD' PARTS OF TECHNOLOGY CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM
THE 'GOOD' PARTS
121. A further reason why industrial society
cannot be reformed in favor of freedom is that modern technology is a unified
system in which all parts are dependent on one another. You can't get rid of
the "bad" parts of technology and retain only the "good"
parts. Take modern medicine, for example. Progress in medical science depends
on progress in chemistry, physics, biology, computer science and other fields.
Advanced medical treatments require expensive, high-tech equipment that can be
made available only by a technologically progressive, economically rich
society. Clearly you can't have much progress in medicine without the whole
technological system and everything that goes with it.
122. Even if medical progress could be maintained
without the rest of the technological system, it would by itself bring certain
evils. Suppose for example that a cure for diabetes is discovered. People with
a genetic tendency to diabetes will then be able to survive and reproduce as
well as anyone else. Natural selection against genes for diabetes will cease
and such genes will spread throughout the population. (This may be occurring to
some extent already, since diabetes, while not curable, can be controlled
through the use of insulin.) The same thing will happen with many other
diseases susceptibility to which is affected by genetic degradation of the
population. The only solution will be some sort of eugenics program or
extensive genetic engineering of human beings, so that man in the future will
no longer be a creation of nature, or of chance, or of God (depending on your
religious or philosophical opinions), but a manufactured product.
123. If you think that big government
interferes in your life too much NOW, just wait till the government starts
regulating the genetic constitution of your children. Such regulation will
inevitably follow the introduction of genetic engineering of human beings,
because the consequences of unregulated genetic engineering would be
disastrous. [19]
124. The usual response to such concerns is
to talk about "medical ethics." But a code of ethics would not serve
to protect freedom in the face of medical progress; it would only make matters
worse. A code of ethics applicable to genetic engineering would be in effect a
means of regulating the genetic constitution of human beings. Somebody
(probably the upper-middle class, mostly) would decide that such and such
applications of genetic engineering were "ethical" and others were
not, so that in effect they would be imposing their own values on the genetic
constitution of the population at large. Even if a code of ethics were chosen
on a completely democratic basis, the majority would be imposing their own
values on any minorities who might have a different idea of what constituted an
"ethical" use of genetic engineering. The only code of ethics that
would truly protect freedom would be one that prohibited ANY genetic
engineering of human beings, and you can be sure that no such code will ever be
applied in a technological society. No code that reduced genetic engineering to
a minor role could stand up for long, because the temptation presented by the
immense power of biotechnology would be irresistible, especially since to the
majority of people many of its applications will seem obviously and
unequivocally good (eliminating physical and mental diseases, giving people the
abilities they need to get along in today's world). Inevitably, genetic
engineering will be used extensively, but only in ways consistent with the
needs of the industrial-technological system. [20]
125. It
is not possible to make a LASTING compromise between technology and freedom,
because technology is by far the more powerful social force and continually
encroaches on freedom through REPEATED compromises. Imagine the case of two
neighbors, each of whom at the outset owns the same amount of land, but one of
whom is more powerful than the other. The powerful one demands a piece of the
other's land. The weak one refuses. The powerful one says, "OK, let's
compromise. Give me half of what I asked." The weak one has little choice
but to give in. Some time later the powerful neighbor demands another piece of
land, again there is a compromise, and so forth. By forcing a long series of
compromises on the weaker man, the powerful one eventually gets all of his
land. So it goes in the conflict between technology and freedom.
126. Let us explain why technology is a more
powerful social force than the aspiration for freedom.
127. A technological advance that appears not
to threaten freedom often turns out to threaten freedom often turns out to
threaten it very seriously later on. For example, consider motorized transport.
A walking man formerly could go where he pleased, go at his own pace without
observing any traffic regulations, and was independent of technological
support-systems. When motor vehicles were introduced they appeared to increase
man's freedom. They took no freedom away from the walking man, no one had to
have an automobile if he didn't want one, and anyone who did choose to buy an
automobile could travel much faster than the walking man. But the introduction
of motorized transport soon changed society in such a way as to restrict greatly
man's freedom of locomotion. When automobiles became numerous, it became
necessary to regulate their use extensively. In a car, especially in densely
populated areas, one cannot just go where one likes at one's own pace one's
movement is governed by the flow of traffic and by various traffic laws. One is
tied down by various obligations: license requirements, driver test, renewing
registration, insurance, maintenance required for safety, monthly payments on
purchase price. Moreover, the use of motorized transport is no longer optional.
Since the introduction of motorized transport the arrangement of our cities has
changed in such a way that the majority of people no longer live within walking
distance of their place of employment, shopping areas and recreational
opportunities, so that they HAVE TO depend on the automobile for
transportation. Or else they must use public transportation, in which case they
have even less control over their own movement than when driving a car. Even
the walker's freedom is now greatly restricted. In the city he continually has
to stop and wait for traffic lights that are designed mainly to serve auto
traffic. In the country, motor traffic makes it dangerous and unpleasant to
walk along the highway. (Note the important point we have illustrated with the
case of motorized transport: When a new item of technology is introduced as an
option that an individual can accept or not as he chooses, it does not
necessarily REMAIN optional. In many cases the new technology changes society
in such a way that people eventually find themselves FORCED to use it.)
128. While technological progress AS A WHOLE
continually narrows our sphere of freedom, each new technical advance
CONSIDERED BY ITSELF appears to be desirable. Electricity, indoor plumbing,
rapid long-distance communications . . . how could one argue against any of
these things, or against any other of the innumerable technical advances that
have made modern society? It would have been absurd to resist the introduction
of the telephone, for example. It offered many advantages and no disadvantages.
Yet as we explained in paragraphs 59-76, all these technical advances taken
together have created world in which the average man's fate is no longer in his
own hands or in the hands of his neighbors and friends, but in those of
politicians, corporation executives and remote, anonymous technicians and
bureaucrats whom he as an individual has no power to influence. [21] The same
process will continue in the future. Take genetic engineering, for example. Few
people will resist the introduction of a genetic technique that eliminates a
hereditary disease It does no apparent harm and prevents much suffering. Yet a
large number of genetic improvements taken together will make the human being
into an engineered product rather than a free creation of chance (or of God, or
whatever, depending on your religious beliefs).
129 Another reason why technology is such a
powerful social force is that, within the context of a given society,
technological progress marches in only one direction; it can never be reversed.
Once a technical innovation has been introduced, people usually become
dependent on it, unless it is replaced by some still more advanced innovation.
Not only do people become dependent as individuals on a new item of technology,
but, even more, the system as a whole becomes dependent on it. (Imagine what
would happen to the system today if computers, for example, were eliminated.)
Thus the system can move in only one direction, toward greater technologization.
Technology repeatedly forces freedom to take a step back -- short of the
overthrow of the whole technological system.
130. Technology advances with great rapidity
and threatens freedom at many different points at the same time (crowding, rules
and regulations, increasing dependence of individuals on large organizations,
propaganda and other psychological techniques, genetic engineering, invasion of
privacy through surveillance devices and computers, etc.) To hold back any ONE
of the threats to freedom would require a long different social struggle. Those
who want to protect freedom are overwhelmed by the sheer number of new attacks
and the rapidity with which they develop, hence they become pathetic and no
longer resist. To fight each of the threats separately would be futile. Success
can be hoped for only by fighting the technological system as a whole; but that
is revolution not reform.
131. Technicians (we use this term in its
broad sense to describe all those who perform a specialized task that requires
training) tend to be so involved in their work (their surrogate activity) that
when a conflict arises between their technical work and freedom, they almost
always decide in favor of their technical work. This is obvious in the case of
scientists, but it also appears elsewhere: Educators, humanitarian groups,
conservation organizations do not hesitate to use propaganda or other
psychological techniques to help them achieve their laudable ends. Corporations
and government agencies, when they find it useful, do not hesitate to collect
information about individuals without regard to their privacy. Law enforcement
agencies are frequently inconvenienced by the constitutional rights of suspects
and often of completely innocent persons, and they do whatever they can do
legally (or sometimes illegally) to restrict or circumvent those rights. Most
of these educators, government officials and law officers believe in freedom,
privacy and constitutional rights, but when these conflict with their work, they
usually feel that their work is more important.
132. It is well known that people generally
work better and more persistently when striving for a reward than when
attempting to avoid a punishment or negative outcome. Scientists and other
technicians are motivated mainly by the rewards they get through their work.
But those who oppose technilogiccal invasions of freedom are working to avoid a
negative outcome, consequently there are a few who work persistently and well
at this discouraging task. If reformers ever achieved a signal victory that
seemed to set up a solid barrier against further erosion of freedom through
technological progress, most would tend to relax and turn their attention to
more agreeable pursuits. But the scientists would remain busy in their
laboratories, and technology as it progresses would find ways, in spite of any
barriers, to exert more and more control over individuals and make them always
more dependent on the system.
133. No social arrangements, whether laws,
institutions, customs or ethical codes, can provide permanent protection
against technology. History shows that all social arrangements are transitory;
they all change or break down eventually. But technological advances are
permanent within the context of a given civilization. Suppose for example that
it were possible to arrive at some social arrangements that would prevent
genetic engineering from being applied to human beings, or prevent it from
being applied in such a ways as to threaten freedom and dignity. Still, the technology
would remain waiting. Sooner or later the social arrangement would break down.
Probably sooner, given that pace of change in our society. Then genetic
engineering would begin to invade our sphere of freedom, and this invasion
would be irreversible (short of a breakdown of technological civilization
itself). Any illusions about achieving anything permanent through social
arrangements should be dispelled by what is currently happening with
environmental legislation. A few years ago it seemed that there were secure
legal barriers preventing at least SOME of the worst forms of environmental
degradation. A change in the political wind, and those barriers begin to
crumble.
134. For all of the foregoing reasons,
technology is a more powerful social force than the aspiration for freedom. But
this statement requires an important qualification. It appears that during the
next several decades the industrial-technological system will be undergoing
severe stresses due to economic and environmental problems, and especially due
to problems of human behavior (alienation, rebellion, hostility, a variety of
social and psychological difficulties). We hope that the stresses through which
the system is likely to pass will cause it to break down, or at least weaken it
sufficiently so that a revolution occurs and is successful, then at that
particular moment the aspiration for freedom will have proved more powerful
than technology.
135. In paragraph 125 we used an analogy of a
weak neighbor who is left destitute by a strong neighbor who takes all his land
by forcing on him a series of compromises. But suppose now that the strong
neighbor gets sick, so that he is unable to defend himself. The weak neighbor
can force the strong one to give him his land back, or he can kill him. If he
lets the strong man survive and only forces him to give his land back, he is a
fool, because when the strong man gets well he will again take all the land for
himself. The only sensible alternative for the weaker man is to kill the strong
one while he has the chance. In the same way, while the industrial system is
sick we must destroy it. If we compromise with it and let it recover from its
sickness, it will eventually wipe out all of our freedom.
136. If anyone still imagines that it would
be possible to reform the system in such a way as to protect freedom from
technology, let him consider how clumsily and for the most part unsuccessfully
our society has dealt with other social problems that are far more simple and
straightforward. Among other things, the system has failed to stop
environmental degradation, political corruption, drug trafficking or domestic
abuse.
137. Take our environmental problems, for
example. Here the conflict of values is straightforward: economic expedience
now versus saving some of our natural resources for our grandchildren [22] But
on this subject we get only a lot of blather and obfuscation from the people
who have power, and nothing like a clear, consistent line of action, and we
keep on piling up environmental problems that our grandchildren will have to
live with. Attempts to resolve the environmental issue consist of struggles and
compromises between different factions, some of which are ascendant at one
moment, others at another moment. The line of struggle changes with the
shifting currents of public opinion. This is not a rational process, or is it
one that is likely to lead to a timely and successful solution to the problem.
Major social problems, if they get "solved" at all, are rarely or
never solved through any rational, comprehensive plan. They just work
themselves out through a process in which various competing groups pursing
their own usually short-term) self-interest [23] arrive (mainly by luck) at some
more or less stable modus vivendi. In fact, the principles we formulated in
paragraphs 100-106 make it seem doubtful that rational, long-term social
planning can EVER be successful. 138. Thus it is clear that the human race has
at best a very limited capacity for solving even relatively straightforward
social problems. How then is it going to solve the far more difficult and
subtle problem of reconciling freedom with technology? Technology presents
clear-cut material advantages, whereas freedom is an abstraction that means
different things to different people, and its loss is easily obscured by
propaganda and fancy talk.
139. And note this important difference: It
is conceivable that our environmental problems (for example) may some day be
settled through a rational, comprehensive plan, but if this happens it will be
only because it is in the long-term interest of the system to solve these
problems. But it is NOT in the interest of the system to preserve freedom or
small-group autonomy. On the contrary, it is in the interest of the system to
bring human behavior under control to the greatest possible extent. <24>
Thus, while practical considerations may eventually force the system to take a
rational, prudent approach to environmental problems, equally practical considerations
will force the system to regulate human behavior ever more closely (preferably
by indirect means that will disguise the encroachment on freedom.) This isn't
just our opinion. Eminent social scientists (e.g. James Q. Wilson) have
stressed the importance of "socializing" people more effectively.
140. We hope we have convinced the reader
that the system cannot be reformed in a such a way as to reconcile freedom with
technology. The only way out is to dispense with the industrial-technological
system altogether. This implies revolution, not necessarily an armed uprising,
but certainly a radical and fundamental change in the nature of society.
141. People tend to assume that because a
revolution involves a much greater change than reform does, it is more
difficult to bring about than reform is. Actually, under certain circumstances
revolution is much easier than reform. The reason is that a revolutionary
movement can inspire an intensity of commitment that a reform movement cannot
inspire. A reform movement merely offers to solve a particular social problem A
revolutionary movement offers to solve all problems at one stroke and create a
whole new world; it provides the kind of ideal for which people will take great
risks and make great sacrifices. For this reasons it would be much easier to
overthrow the whole technological system than to put effective, permanent
restraints on the development of application of any one segment of technology,
such as genetic engineering, but under suitable conditions large numbers of
people may devote themselves passionately to a revolution against the
industrial-technological system. As we noted in paragraph 132, reformers
seeking to limite certain aspects of technology would be working to avoid a
negative outcome. But revolutionaries work to gain a powerful reward --
fulfillment of their revolutionary vision -- and therefore work harder and more
persistently than reformers do.
142. Reform is always restrainde by the fear
of painful consequences if changes go too far. But once a revolutionary fever
has taken hold of a society, people are willing to undergo unlimited hardships
for the sake of their revolution. This was clearly shown in the French and
Russian Revolutions. It may be that in such cases only a minority of the
population is really committed to the revolution, but this minority is
sufficiently large and active so that it becomes the dominant force in society.
We will have more to say about revolution in paragraphs 180-205.
143. Since the beginning of civilization,
organized societies have had to put pressures on human beings of the sake of
the functioning of the social organism. The kinds of pressures vary greatly
from one society to another. Some of the pressures are physical (poor diet,
excessive labor, environmental pollution), some are psychological (noise,
crowding, forcing humans behavior into the mold that society requires). In the
past, human nature has been approximately constant, or at any rate has varied
only within certain bounds. Consequently, societies have been able to push
people only up to certain limits. When the limit of human endurance has been
passed, things start going rong: rebellion, or crime, or corruption, or evasion
of work, or depression and other mental problems, or an elevated death rate, or
a declining birth rate or something else, so that either the society breaks
down, or its functioning becomes too inefficient and it is (quickly or
gradually, through conquest, attrition or evolution) replaces by some more
efficient form of society.
[25]
144. Thus human nature has in the past put
certain limits on the development of societies. People coud be pushed only so
far and no farther. But today this may be changing, because modern technology
is developing way of modifying human beings.
145. Imagine a society that subjects people
to conditions that amke them terribley unhappy, then gives them the drugs to
take away their unhappiness. Science fiction? It is already happening to some extent
in our own society. It is well known that the rate of clinical depression had
been greatly increasing in recent decades. We believe that this is due to
disruption fo the power process, as explained in paragraphs 59-76. But even if
we are wrong, the increasing rate of depression is certainly the result of SOME
conditions that exist in today's society. Instead of removing the conditions
that make people depressed, modern society gives them antidepressant drugs. In
effect, antidepressants area a means of modifying an individual's internal
state in such a way as to enable him to toelrate social conditions that he
would otherwise find intolerable. (Yes, we know that depression is often of
purely genetic origin. We are referring here to those cases in which
environment plays the predominant role.)
146. Drugs that affect the mind are only one
example of the methods of controlling human behavior that modern society is
developing. Let us look at some of the other methods.
147. To start with, there are the techniques
of surveillance. Hidden video cameras are now used in most stores and in many
other places, computers are used to collect and process vast amounts of
information about individuals. Information so obtained greatly increases the
effectiveness of physical coercion (i.e., law enforcement).[26] Then there are
the methods of propaganda, for which the mass communication media provide
effective vehicles. Efficient techniques have been developed for winning
elections, selling products, influencing public opinion. The entertainment
industry serves as an important psychological tool of the system, possibly even
when it is dishing out large amounts of sex and violence. Entertainment
provides modern man with an essential means of escape. While absorbed in television,
videos, etc., he can forget stress, anxiety, frustration, dissatisfaction. Many
primitive peoples, when they don't have work to do, are quite content to sit
for hours at a time doing nothing at all, because they are at peace with
themselves and their world. But most modern people must be contantly occupied
or entertained, otherwise the get "bored," i.e., they get fidgety,
uneasy, irritable.
148. Other techniques strike deeper that the
foregoing. Education is no longer a simple affair of paddling a kid's behind
when he doesn't know his lessons and patting him on the head when he does know
them. It is becoming a scientific technique for controlling the child's
development. Sylvan Learning Centers, for example, have had great success in
motivating children to study, and psychological techniques are also used with
more or less success in many conventional schools. "Parenting"
techniques that are taught to parents are designed to make children accept
fundamental values of the system and behave in ways that the system finds
desirable. "Mental health" programs, "intervention"
techniques, psychotherapy and so forth are ostensibly designed to benefit
individuals, but in practice they usually serve as methods for inducing
individuals to think and behave as the system requires. (There is no
contradiction here; an individual whose attitudes or behavior bring him into
conflict with the system is up against a force that is too powerful for him to
conquer or escape from, hence he is likely to suffer from stress, frustration,
defeat. His path will be much easier if he thinks and behaves as the system
requires. In that sense the system is acting for the benefit of the individual
when it brainwashes him into conformity.) Child abuse in its gross and obvious
forms is disapproved in most if not all cultures. Tormenting a child for a
trivial reason or no reason at all is something that appalls almost everyone.
But many psychologists interpret the concept of abuse much more broadly. Is
spanking, when used as part of a rational and consistent system of discipline,
a form of abuse? The question will ultimately be decided by whether or not
spanking tends to produce behavior that makes a person fit in well with the
existing system of society. In practice, the word "abuse" tends to be
interpreted to include any method of child-rearing that produces behavior
inconvenient for the system. Thus, when they go beyond the prevention of
obvious, senseless cruelty, programs for preventing "child abuse" are
directed toward the control of human behavior of the system.
149. Presumably, research will continue to
increas the effectiveness of psychological techniques for controlling human
behavior. But we think it is unlikely that psychological techniques alone will
be sufficient to adjust human beings to the kind of society that technology is
creating. Biological methods probably will have to be used. We have already
mentiond the use of drugs in this connection. Neurology may provide other
avenues of modifying the human mind. Genetic engineering of human beings is
already beginning to occur in the form of "gene therapy," and there
is no reason to assume the such methods will not eventually be used to modify
those aspects of the body that affect mental funtioning.
150. As we mentioned in paragraph 134,
industrial society seems likely to be entering a period of severe stress, due
in part to problems of human behavior and in part to economic and environmental
problems. And a considerable proportion of the system's economic and
environmental problems result from the way human beings behave. Alienation, low
self-esteem, depression, hostility, rebellion; children who won't study, youth
gangs, illegal drug use, rape, child abuse , other crimes, unsafe sex, teen
pregnancy, population growth, political corruption, race hatred, ethnic
rivalry, bitter ideological conflict (i.e., pro-choice vs. pro-life), political
extremism, terrorism, sabotage, anti-government groups, hate groups. All these
threaten the very survival of the system. The system will be FORCED to use
every practical means of controlling human behavior.
151. The social disruption that we see today
is certainly not the result of mere chance. It can only be a result fo the
conditions of life that the system imposes on people. (We have argued that the
most important of these conditions is disruption of the power process.) If the
systems succeeds in imposing sufficient control over human behavior to assure
itw own survival, a new watershed in human history will have passed. Whereas
formerly the limits of human endurance have imposed limits on the development
of societies (as we explained in paragraphs 143, 144), industrial-technological
society will be able to pass those limits by modifying human beings, whether by
psychological methods or biological methods or both. In the future, social
systems will not be adjusted to suit the needs of human beings. Instead, human
being will be adjusted to suit the needs of the system.
[27] 152. Generally speaking, technological
control over human behavior will probably not be introduced with a totalitarian
intention or even through a conscious desire to restrict human freedom. [28]
Each new step in the assertion of control over the human mind will be taken as
a rational response to a problem that faces society, such as curing alcoholism,
reducing the crime rate or inducing young people to study science and
engineering. In many cases, there will be humanitarian justification. For
example, when a psychiatrist prescribes an anti-depressant for a depressed
patient, he is clearly doing that individual a favor. It would be inhumane to
withhold the drug from someone who needs it. When parents send their children
to Sylvan Learning Centers to have them manipulated into becoming enthusiastic
about their studies, they do so from concern for their children's welfare. It
may be that some of these parents wish that one didn't have to have specialized
training to get a job and that their kid didn't have to be brainwashed into
becoming a computer nerd. But what can they do? They can't change society, and
their child may be unemployable if he doesn't have certain skills. So they send
him to Sylvan.
153. Thus control over human behavior will be
introduced not by a calculated decision of the authorities but through a
process of social evolution (RAPID evolution, however). The process will be
impossible to resist, because each advance, considered by itself, will appear
to be beneficial, or at least the evil involved in making the advance will
appear to be beneficial, or at least the evil involved in making the advance
will seem to be less than that which would result from not making it (see
paragraph 127). Propaganda for example is used for many good purposes, such as
discouraging child abuse or race hatred. [14] Sex education is obviously useful,
yet the effect of sex education (to the extent that it is successful) is to
take the shaping of sexual attitudes away from the family and put it into the
hands of the state as represented by the public school system.
154. Suppose a biological trait is discovered
that increases the likelihood that a child will grow up to be a criminal and
suppose some sort of gene therapy can remove this trait. [29] Of course most
parents whose children possess the trait will have them undergo the therapy. It
would be inhumane to do otherwise, since the child would probably have a
miserable life if he grew up to be a criminal. But many or most primitive
societies have a low crime rate in comparison with that of our society, even
though they have neither high-tech methods of child-rearing nor harsh systems
of punishment. Since there is no reason to suppose that more modern men than
primitive men have innate predatory tendencies, the high crime rate of our
society must be due to the pressures that modern conditions put on people, to
which many cannot or will not adjust. Thus a treatment designed to remove
potential criminal tendencies is at least in part a way of re-engineering
people so that they suit the requirements of the system.
155. Our society tends to regard as a "sickness"
any mode of thought or behavior that is inconvenient for the system, and this
is plausible because when an individual doesn't fit into the system it causes
pain to the individual as well as problems for the system. Thus the
manipulation of an individual to adjust him to the system is seen as a
"cure" for a "sickness" and therefore as good.
156. In paragraph 127 we pointed out that if
the use of a new item of technology is INITIALLY optional, it does not
necessarily REMAIN optional, because the new technology tends to change society
in such a way that it becomes difficult or impossible for an individual to
function without using that technology. This applies also to the technology of
human behavior. In a world in which most children are put through a program to
make them enthusiastic about studying, a parent will almost be forced to put
his kid through such a program, because if he does not, then the kid will grow
up to be, comparatively speaking, an ignoramus and therefore unemployable. Or
suppose a biological treatment is discovered that, without undesirable
side-effects, will greatly reduce the psychological stress from which so many
people suffer in our society. If large numbers of people choose to undergo the
treatment, then the general level of stress in society will be reduced, so that
it will be possible for the system to increase the stress-producing pressures.
In fact, something like this seems to have happened already with one of our
society's most important psychological tools for enabling people to reduce (or
at least temporarily escape from) stress, namely, mass entertainment (see
paragraph 147). Our use of mass entertainment is "optional": No law
requires us to watch television, listen to the radio, read magazines. Yet mass
entertainment is a means of escape and stress-reduction on which most of us
have become dependent. Everyone complains about the trashiness of television,
but almost everyone watches it. A few have kicked the TV habit, but it would be
a rare person who could get along today without using ANY form of mass
entertainment. (Yet until quite recently in human history most people got along
very nicely with no other entertainment than that which each local community
created for itself.) Without the entertainment industry the system probably
would not have been able to get away with putting as much stress-producing
pressure on us as it does.
157. Assuming that industrial society
survives, it is likely that technology will eventually acquire something
approaching complete control over human behavior. It has been established
beyond any rational doubt that human thought and behavior have a largely
biological basis. As experimenters have demonstrated, feelings such as hunger,
pleasure, anger and fear can be turned on and off by electrical stimulation of
appropriate parts of the brain. Memories can be destroyed by damaging parts of
the brain or they can be brought to the surface by electrical stimulation.
Hallucinations can be induced or moods changed by drugs. There may or may not
be an immaterial human soul, but if there is one it clearly is less powerful
that the biological mechanisms of human behavior. For if that were not the case
then researchers would not be able so easily to manipulate human feelings and
behavior with drugs and electrical currents.
158. It presumably would be impractical for
all people to have electrodes inserted in their heads so that they could be
controlled by the authorities. But the fact that human thoughts and feelings
are so open to biological intervention shows that the problem of controlling
human behavior is mainly a technical problem; a problem of neurons, hormones
and complex molecules; the kind of problem that is accessible to scientific
attack. Given the outstanding record of our society in solving technical
problems, it is overwhelmingly probable that great advances will be made in the
control of human behavior.
159. Will public resistance prevent the
introduction of technological control of human behavior? It certainly would if
an attempt were made to introduce such control all at once. But since
technological control will be introduced through a long sequence of small
advances, there will be no rational and effective public resistance. (See
paragraphs 127,132, 153.)
160. To those who think that all this sounds
like science fiction, we point out that yesterday's science fiction is today's
fact. The Industrial Revolution has radically altered man's environment and way
of life, and it is only to be expected that as technology is increasingly
applied to the human body and mind, man himself will be altered as radically as
his environment and way of life have been.
161. But we have gotten ahead of our story.
It is one thing to develop in the laboratory a series of psychological or
biological techniques for manipulating human behavior and quite another to
integrate these techniques into a functioning social system. The latter problem
is the more difficult of the two. For example, while the techniques of
educational psychology doubtless work quite well in the "lab schools"
where they are developed, it is not necessarily easy to apply them effectively
throughout our educational system. We all know what many of our schools are
like. The teachers are too busy taking knives and guns away from the kids to
subject them to the latest techniques for making them into computer nerds.
Thus, in spite of all its technical advances relating to human behavior the
system to date has not been impressively successful in controlling human
beings. The people whose behavior is fairly well under the control of the
system are those of the type that might be called "bourgeois." But
there are growing numbers of people who in one way or another are rebels
against the system: welfare leaches, youth gangs cultists, satanists, nazis,
radical environmentalists, militiamen, etc..
162. The system is currently engaged in a
desperate struggle to overcome certain problems that threaten its survival,
among which the problems of human behavior are the most important. If the
system succeeds in acquiring sufficient control over human behavior quickly
enough, it will probably survive. Otherwise it will break down. We think the
issue will most likely be resolved within the next several decades, say 40 to
100 years.
people will have any real power, and even
these probably will have only very limited freedom, because their behavior too
will be regulated; just as today our politicians and corporation executives can
retain their positions of power only as long as their behavior remains within
certain fairly narrow limits.
164. Don't imagine that the systems will stop
developing further techniques for controlling human beings and nature once the
crisis of the next few decades is over and increasing control is no longer
necessary for the system's survival. On the contrary, once the hard times are
over the system will increase its control over people and nature more rapidly,
because it will no longer be hampered by difficulties of the kind that it is
currently experiencing. Survival is not the principal motive for extending
control. As we explained in paragraphs 87-90, technicians and scientists carry
on their work largely as a surrogate activity; that is, they satisfy their need
for power by solving technical problems. They will continue to do this with
unabated enthusiasm, and among the most interesting and challenging problems
for them to solve will be those of understanding the human body and mind and
intervening in their development. For the "good of humanity," of
course.
165. But suppose on the other hand that the
stresses of the coming decades prove to be too much for the system. If the
system breaks down there may be a period of chaos, a "time of
troubles" such as those that history has recorded: at various epochs in
the past. It is impossible to predict what would emerge from such a time of
troubles, but at any rate the human race would be given a new chance. The
greatest danger is that industrial society may begin to reconstitute itself
within the first few years after the breakdown. Certainly there will be many
people (power-hungry types especially) who will be anxious to get the factories
running again.
166. Therefore two tasks confront those who
hate the servitude to which the industrial system is reducing the human race.
First, we must work to heighten the social stresses within the system so as to
increase the likelihood that it will break down or be weakened sufficiently so
that a revolution against it becomes possible. Second, it is necessary to develop
and propagate an ideology that opposes technology and the industrial society if
and when the system becomes sufficiently weakened. And such an ideology will
help to assure that, if and when industrial society breaks down, its remnants
will be smashed beyond repair, so that the system cannot be reconstituted. The
factories should be destroyed, technical books burned, etc.
167. The industrial system will not break
down purely as a result of revolutionary action. It will not be vulnerable to
revolutionary attack unless its own internal problems of development lead it
into very serious difficulties. So if the system breaks down it will do so
either spontaneously, or through a process that is in part spontaneous but
helped along by revolutionaries. If the breakdown is sudden, many people will
die, since the world's population has become so overblown that it cannot even
feed itself any longer without advanced technology. Even if the breakdown is
gradual enough so that reduction of the population can occur more through
lowering of the birth rate than through elevation of the death rate, the
process of de-industrialization probably will be very chaotic and involve much
suffering. It is naive to think it likely that technology can be phased out in
a smoothly managed orderly way, especially since the technophiles will fight
stubbornly at every step. Is it therefore cruel to work for the breakdown of
the system? Maybe, but maybe not. In the first place, revolutionaries will not
be able to break the system down unless it is already in deep trouble so that
there would be a good chance of its eventually breaking down by itself anyway;
and the bigger the system grows, the more disastrous the consequences of its
breakdown will be; so it may be that revolutionaries, by hastening the onset of
the breakdown will be reducing the extent of the disaster.
168. In the second place, one has to balance
the struggle and death against the loss of freedom and dignity. To many of us,
freedom and dignity are more important than a long life or avoidance of
physical pain. Besides, we all have to die some time, and it may be better to
die fighting for survival, or for a cause, than to live a long but empty and
purposeless life.
169. In the third place, it is not all certain
that the survival of the system will lead to less suffering than the breakdown
of the system would. The system has already caused, and is continuing to cause
, immense suffering all over the world. Ancient cultures, that for hundreds of
years gave people a satisfactory relationship with each other and their
environment, have been shattered by contact with industrial society, and the
result has been a whole catalogue of economic, environmental, social and
psychological problems. One of the effects of the intrusion of industrial
society has been that over much of the world traditional controls on population
have been thrown out of balance. Hence the population explosion, with all that
it implies. Then there is the psychological suffering that is widespread
throughout the supposedly fortunate countries of the West (see paragraphs 44,
45). No one knows what will happen as a result of ozone depletion, the
greenhouse effect and other environmental problems that cannot yet be foreseen.
And, as nuclear proliferation has shown, new technology cannot be kept out of
the hands of dictators and irresponsible
170. "Oh!" say the technophiles,
"Science is going to fix all that! We will conquer famine, eliminate
psychological suffering, make everybody healthy and happy!" Yeah, sure.
That's what they said 200 years ago. The Industrial Revolution was supposed to
eliminate poverty, make everybody happy, etc. The actual result has been quite
different. The technophiles are hopelessly naive (or self-deceiving) in their
understanding of social problems. They are unaware of (or choose to ignore) the
fact that when large changes, even seemingly beneficial ones, are introduced
into a society, they lead to a long sequence of other changes, most of which
are impossible to predict (paragraph 103). The result is disruption of the
society. So it is very probable that in their attempt to end poverty and
disease, engineer docile, happy personalities and so forth, the technophiles
will create social systems that are terribly troubled, even more so that the
present one. For example, the scientists boast that they will end famine by
creating new, genetically engineered food plants. But this will allow the human
population to keep expanding indefinitely, and it is well known that crowding
leads to increased stress and aggression. This is merely one example of the
PREDICTABLE problems that will arise. We emphasize that, as past experience has
shown, technical progress will lead to other new problems for society far more
rapidly that it has been solving old ones. Thus it will take a long difficult
period of trial and error for the technophiles to work the bugs out of their
Brave New World (if they ever do). In the meantime there will be great
suffering. So it is not all clear that the survival of industrial society would
involve less suffering than the breakdown of that society would. Technology has
gotten the human race into a fix from which there is not likely to be any easy
escape.
171. But suppose now that industrial society
does survive the next several decade and that the bugs do eventually get worked
out of the system, so that it functions smoothly. What kind of system will it
be? We will consider several possibilities.
172. First let us postulate that the computer
scientists succeed in developing intelligent machines that can do all things
better that human beings can do them. In that case presumably all work will be
done by vast, highly organized systems of machines and no human effort will be
necessary. Either of two cases might occur. The machines might be permitted to
make all of their own decisions without human oversight, or else human control
over the machines might be retained.
173. If the machines are permitted to make
all their own decisions, we can't make any conjectures as to the results,
because it is impossible to guess how such machines might behave. We only point
out that the fate of the human race would be at the mercy of the machines. It
might be argued that the human race would never be foolish enough to hand over
all the power to the machines. But we are suggesting neither that the human
race would voluntarily turn power over to the machines nor that the machines
would willfully seize power. What we do suggest is that the human race might
easily permit itself to drift into a position of such dependence on the
machines that it would have no practical choice but to accept all of the
machines decisions. As society and the problems that face it become more and
more complex and machines become more and more intelligent, people will let
machines make more of their decision for them, simply because machine-made
decisions will bring better result than man-made ones. Eventually a stage may
be reached at which the decisions necessary to keep the system running will be
so complex that human beings will be incapable of making them intelligently. At
that stage the machines will be in effective control. People won't be able to
just turn the machines off, because they will be so dependent on them that
turning them off would amount to suicide.
174. On the other hand it is possible that
human control over the machines may be retained. In that case the average man
may have control over certain private machines of his own, such as his car of
his personal computer, but control over large systems of machines will be in
the hands of a tiny elite -- just as it is today, but with two difference. Due
to improved techniques the elite will have greater control over the masses; and
because human work will no longer be necessary the masses will be superfluous,
a useless burden on the system. If the elite is ruthless the may simply decide
to exterminate the mass of humanity. If they are humane they may use propaganda
or other psychological or biological techniques to reduce the birth rate until
the mass of humanity becomes extinct, leaving the world to the elite. Or, if
the elite consist of soft-hearted liberals, they may decide to play the role of
good shepherds to the rest of the human race. They will see to it that
everyone's physical needs are satisfied, that all children are raised under
psychologically hygienic conditions, that everyone has a wholesome hobby to
keep him busy, and that anyone who may become dissatisfied undergoes
"treatment" to cure his "problem." Of course, life will be
so purposeless that people will have to be biologically or psychologically
engineered either to remove their need for the power process or to make them
"sublimate" their drive for power into some harmless hobby. These
engineered human beings may be happy in such a society, but they most certainly
will not be free. They will have been reduced to the status of domestic
animals.
175. But suppose now that the computer
scientists do not succeed in developing artificial intelligence, so that human
work remains necessary. Even so, machines will take care of more and more of
the simpler tasks so that there will be an increasing surplus of human workers
at the lower levels of ability. (We see this happening already. There are many
people who find it difficult or impossible to get work, because for
intellectual or psychological reasons they cannot acquire the level of training
necessary to make themselves useful in the present system.) On those who are
employed, ever-increasing demands will be placed; They will need more and m ore
training, more and more ability, and will have to be ever more reliable,
conforming and docile, because they will be more and more like cells of a giant
organism. Their tasks will be increasingly specialized so that their work will
be, in a sense, out of touch with the real world, being concentrated on one
tiny slice of reality. The system will have to use any means that I can,
whether psychological or biological, to engineer people to be docile, to have
the abilities that the system requires and to "sublimate" their drive
for power into some specialized task. But the statement that the people of such
a society will have to be docile may require qualification. The society may
find competitiveness useful, provided that ways are found of directing
competitiveness into channels that serve that needs of the system. We can
imagine into channels that serve the needs of the system. We can imagine a
future society in which there is endless competition for positions of prestige
an power. But no more than a very few people will ever reach the top, where the
only real power is (see end of paragraph 163). Very repellent is a society in
which a person can satisfy his needs for power only by pushing large numbers of
other people out of the way and depriving them of THEIR opportunity for power.
176. Once can envision scenarios that
incorporate aspects of more than one of the possibilities that we have just discussed.
For instance, it may be that machines will take over most of the work that is
of real, practical importance, but that human beings will be kept busy by being
given relatively unimportant work. It has been suggested, for example, that a
great development of the service of industries might provide work for human
beings. Thus people will would spend their time shinning each others shoes,
driving each other around inn taxicab, making handicrafts for one another,
waiting on each other's tables, etc. This seems to us a thoroughly contemptible
way for the human race to end up, and we doubt that many people would find
fulfilling lives in such pointless busy-work. They would seek other, dangerous
outlets (drugs, , crime, "cults," hate groups) unless they were
biological or psychologically engineered to adapt them to such a way of life.
177. Needless to day, the scenarios outlined
above do not exhaust all the possibilities. They only indicate the kinds of
outcomes that seem to us mots likely. But wee can envision no plausible
scenarios that are any more palatable that the ones we've just described. It is
overwhelmingly probable that if the industrial-technological system survives
the next 40 to 100 years, it will by that time have developed certain general characteristics:
Individuals (at least those of the "bourgeois" type, who are
integrated into the system and make it run, and who therefore have all the
power) will be more dependent than ever on large organizations; they will be
more "socialized" that ever and their physical and mental qualities
to a significant extent (possibly to a very great extent ) will be those that
are engineered into them rather than being the results of chance (or of God's
will, or whatever); and whatever may be left of wild nature will be reduced to
remnants preserved for scientific study and kept under the supervision and
management of scientists (hence it will no longer be truly wild). In the long
run (say a few centuries from now) it is it is likely that neither the human
race nor any other important organisms will exist as we know them today,
because once you start modifying organisms through genetic engineering there is
no reason to stop at any particular point, so that the modifications will
probably continue until man and other organisms have been utterly transformed.
178. Whatever else may be the case, it is
certain that technology is creating for human begins a new physical and social
environment radically different from the spectrum of environments to which
natural selection has adapted the human race physically and psychological. If
man is not adjust to this new environment by being artificially re-engineered,
then he will be adapted to it through a long an painful process of natural
selection. The former is far more likely that the latter.
179. It would be better to dump the whole
stinking system and take the consequences.
180. The technophiles are taking us all on an
utterly reckless ride into the unknown. Many people understand something of
what technological progress is doing to us yet take a passive attitude toward
it because they think it is inevitable. But we (FC) don't think it is
inevitable. We think it can be stopped, and we will give here some indications
of how to go about stopping it.
181. As we stated in paragraph 166, the two
main tasks for the present are to promote social stress and instability in
industrial society and to develop and propagate an ideology that opposes
technology and the industrial system. When the system becomes sufficiently stressed
and unstable, a revolution against technology may be possible. The pattern
would be similar to that of the French and Russian Revolutions. French society
and Russian society, for several decades prior to their respective revolutions,
showed increasing signs of stress and weakness. Meanwhile, ideologies were
being developed that offered a new world view that was quite different from the
old one. In the Russian case, revolutionaries were actively working to
undermine the old order. Then, when the old system was put under sufficient
additional stress (by financial crisis in
182. It will be objected that the French and
Russian Revolutions were failures. But most revolutions have two goals. One is
to destroy an old form of society and the other is to set up the new form of
society envisioned by the revolutionaries. The French and Russian
revolutionaries failed (fortunately!) to create the new kind of society of
which they dreamed, but they were quite successful in destroying the existing
form of society.
183. But an ideology, in order to gain
enthusiastic support, must have a positive ideals well as a negative one; it
must be FOR something as well as AGAINST something. The positive ideal that we
propose is Nature. That is , WILD nature; those aspects of the functioning of
the Earth and its living things that are independent of human management and
free of human interference and control. And with wild nature we include human
nature, by which we mean those aspects of the functioning of the human
individual that are not subject to regulation by organized society but are
products of chance, or free will, or God (depending on your religious or philosophical
opinions).
184. Nature makes a perfect counter-ideal to
technology for several reasons. Nature (that which is outside the power of the
system) is the opposite of technology (which seeks to expand indefinitely the
power of the system). Most people will agree that nature is beautiful;
certainly it has tremendous popular appeal. The radical environmentalists
ALREADY hold an ideology that exalts nature and opposes technology. [30] It is
not necessary for the sake of nature to set up some chimerical utopia or any
new kind of social order. Nature takes care of itself: It was a spontaneous
creation that existed long before any human society, and for countless
centuries many different kinds of human societies coexisted with nature without
doing it an excessive amount of damage. Only with the Industrial Revolution did
the effect of human society on nature become really devastating. To relieve the
pressure on nature it is not necessary to create a special kind of social
system, it is only necessary to get rid of industrial society. Granted, this
will not solve all problems. Industrial society has already done tremendous
damage to nature and it will take a very long time for the scars to heal.
Besides, even pre-industrial societies can do significant damage to nature.
Nevertheless, getting rid of industrial society will accomplish a great deal.
It will relieve the worst of the pressure on nature so that the scars can begin
to heal. It will remove the capacity of organized society to keep increasing
its control over nature (including human nature). Whatever kind of society may
exist after the demise of the industrial system, it is certain that most people
will live close to nature, because in the absence of advanced technology there
is not other way that people CAN live. To feed themselves they must be peasants
or herdsmen or fishermen or hunter, etc., And, generally speaking, local
autonomy should tend to increase, because lack of advanced technology and rapid
communications will limit the capacity of governments or other large
organizations to control local communities.
185. As for the negative consequences of
eliminating industrial society -- well, you can't eat your cake and have it
too. To gain one thing you have to sacrifice another.
186. Most people hate psychological conflict.
For this reason they avoid doing any serious thinking about difficult social
issues, and they like to have such issues presented to them in simple,
black-and-white terms: THIS is all good and THAT is all bad. The revolutionary
ideology should therefore be developed on two levels.
187. On the more sophisticated level the
ideology should address itself to people who are intelligent, thoughtful and
rational. The object should be to create a core of people who will be opposed
to the industrial system on a rational, thought-out basis, with full
appreciation of the problems and ambiguities involved, and of the price that
has to be paid for getting rid of the system. It is particularly important to
attract people of this type, as they are capable people and will be
instrumental in influencing others. These people should be addressed on as
rational a level as possible. Facts should never intentionally be distorted and
intemperate language should be avoided. This does not mean that no appeal can
be made to the emotions, but in making such appeal care should be taken to
avoid misrepresenting the truth or doing anything else that would destroy the
intellectual respectability of the ideology.
188. On a second level, the ideology should
be propagated in a simplified form that will enable the unthinking majority to
see the conflict of technology vs. nature in unambiguous terms. But even on
this second level the ideology should not be expressed in language that is so
cheap, intemperate or irrational that it alienates people of the thoughtful and
rational type. Cheap, intemperate propaganda sometimes achieves impressive
short-term gains, but it will be more advantageous in the long run to keep the
loyalty of a small number of intelligently committed people than to arouse the
passions of an unthinking, fickle mob who will change their attitude as soon as
someone comes along with a better propaganda gimmick. However, propaganda of
the rabble-rousing type may be necessary when the system is nearing the point
of collapse and there is a final struggle between rival ideologies to determine
which will become dominant when the old world-view goes under.
189. Prior to that final struggle, the
revolutionaries should not expect to have a majority of people on their side.
History is made by active, determined minorities, not by the majority, which
seldom has a clear and consistent idea of what it really wants. Until the time
comes for the final push toward revolution [31], the task of revolutionaries
will be less to win the shallow support of the majority than to build a small
core of deeply committed people. As for the majority, it will be enough to make
them aware of the existence of the new ideology and remind them of it
frequently; though of course it will be desirable to get majority support to
the extent that this can be done without weakening the core of seriously
committed people.
190. Any kind of social conflict helps to
destabilize the system, but one should be careful about what kind of conflict
one encourages. The line of conflict should be drawn between the mass of the
people and the power-holding elite of industrial society (politicians,
scientists, upper-level business executives, government officials, etc..). It
should NOT be drawn between the revolutionaries and the mass of the people. For
example, it would be bad strategy for the revolutionaries to condemn Americans
for their habits of consumption. Instead, the average American should be
portrayed as a victim of the advertising and marketing industry, which has
suckered him into buying a lot of junk that he doesn't need and that is very
poor compensation for his lost freedom. Either approach is consistent with the
facts. It is merely a matter of attitude whether you blame the advertising
industry for manipulating the public or blame the public for allowing itself to
be manipulated. As a matter of strategy one should generally avoid blaming the
public.
191. One should think twice before
encouraging any other social conflict than that between the power-holding elite
(which wields technology) and the general public (over which technology exerts
its power). For one thing, other conflicts tend to distract attention from the
important conflicts (between power-elite and ordinary people, between
technology and nature); for another thing, other conflicts may actually tend to
encourage technologization, because each side in such a conflict wants to use
technological power to gain advantages over its adversary. This is clearly seen
in rivalries between nations. It also appears in ethnic conflicts within
nations. For example, in
192. But the way to discourage ethnic
conflict is NOT through militant advocacy of minority rights (see paragraphs
21, 29). Instead, the revolutionaries should emphasize that although minorities
do suffer more or less disadvantage, this disadvantage is of peripheral
significance. Our real enemy is the industrial-technological system, and in the
struggle against the system, ethnic distinctions are of no importance.
193. The kind of revolution we have in mind
will not necessarily involve an armed uprising against any government. It may
or may not involve physical violence, but it will not be a POLITICAL
revolution. Its focus will be on technology and economics, not politics. [32]
194. Probably the revolutionaries should even
AVOID assuming political power, whether by legal or illegal means, until the
industrial system is stressed to the danger point and has proved itself to be a
failure in the eyes of most people. Suppose for example that some
"green" party should win control of the United States Congress in an
election. In order to avoid betraying or watering down their own ideology they
would have to take vigorous measures to turn economic growth into economic
shrinkage. To the average man the results would appear disastrous: There would
be massive unemployment, shortages of commodities, etc. Even if the grosser ill
effects could be avoided through superhumanly skillful management, still people
would have to begin giving up the luxuries to which they have become addicted.
Dissatisfaction would grow, the "green" party would be voted out of
of fice and the revolutionaries would have suffered a severe setback. For this
reason the revolutionaries should not try to acquire political power until the
system has gotten itself into such a mess that any hardships will be seen as
resulting from the failures of the industrial system itself and not from the
policies of the revolutionaries. The revolution against technology will
probably have to be a revolution by outsiders, a revolution from below and not
from above.
195. The revolution must be international and
worldwide. It cannot be carried out on a nation-by-nation basis. Whenever it is
suggested that the
196. Revolutionaries might consider favoring
measures that tend to bind the world economy into a unified whole. Free trade
agreements like NAFTA and GATT are probably harmful to the environment in the
short run, but in the long run they may perhaps be advantageous because they
foster economic interdependence between nations. I will be eaier to destroy the
industrial system on a worldwide basis if he world economy is so unified that
its breakdown in any on major nation will lead to its breakdwon in al
industrialized nations.
the long run they may perhaps be advantageous
because they foster economic interdependence between nations. It will be easier
to destroy the industrial system on a worldwide basis if the world economy is
so unified that its breakdown in any one major nation will lead to its
breakdown in all industrialized nations.
197. Some people take the line that modern
man has too much power, too much control over nature; they argue for a more
passive attitude on the part of the human race. At best these people are
expressing themselves unclearly, because they fail to distinguish between power
for LARGE ORGANIZATIONS and power for INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS. It is a
mistake to argue for powerlessness and passivity, because people NEED power.
Modern man as a collective entity--that is, the industrial system--has immense
power over nature, and we (FC) regard this as evil. But modern INDIVIDUALS and
SMALL GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS have far less power than primitive man ever did.
Generally speaking, the vast power of "modern man" over nature is
exercised not by individuals or small groups but by large organizations. To the
extent that the average modern INDIVIDUAL can wield the power of technology, he
is permitted to do so only within narrow limits and only under the supervision
and control of the system. (You need a license for everything and with the license
come rules and regulations). The individual has only those technological powers
with which the system chooses to provide him. His PERSONAL power over nature is
slight.
198. Primitive INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS
actually had considerable power over nature; or maybe it would be better to say
power WITHIN nature. When primitive man needed food he knew how to find and
prepare edible roots, how to track game and take it with homemade weapons. He
knew how to protect himself from heat, cold, rain, dangerous animals, etc. But
primitive man did relatively little damage to nature because the COLLECTIVE
power of primitive society was negligible compared to the COLLECTIVE power of
industrial society.
199. Instead of arguing for powerlessness and
passivity, one should argue that the power of the INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM should be
broken, and that this will greatly INCREASE the power and freedom of
INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS.
200. Until the industrial system has been
thoroughly wrecked, the destruction of that system must be the revolutionaries'
ONLY goal. Other goals would distract attention and energy from the main goal.
More importantly, if the revolutionaries permit themselves to have any other
goal than the destruction of technology, they will be tempted to use technology
as a tool for reaching that other goal. If they give in to that temptation,
they will fall right back into the technological trap, because modern
technology is a unified, tightly organized system, so that, in order to retain
SOME technology, one finds oneself obliged to retain MOST technology, hence one
ends up sacrificing only token amounts of technology.
201. Suppose for example that the
revolutionaries took "social justice" as a goal. Human nature being
what it is, social justice would not come about spontaneously; it would have to
be enforced. In order to enforce it the revolutionaries would have to retain
central organization and control. For that they would need rapid long-distance
transportation and communication, and therefore all the technology needed to
support the transportation and communication systems. To feed and clothe poor
people they would have to use agricultural and manufacturing technology. And so
forth. So that the attempt to insure social justice would force them to retain
most parts of the technological system. Not that we have anything against
social justice, but it must not be allowed to interfere with the effort to get
rid of the technological system.
202. It would be hopeless for revolutionaries
to try to attack the system without using SOME modern technology. If nothing
else they must use the communications media to spread their message. But they
should use modern technology for only ONE purpose: to attack the technological
system.
203. Imagine an alcoholic sitting with a
barrel of wine in front of him. Suppose he starts saying to himself, "Wine
isn't bad for you if used in moderation. Why, they say small amounts of wine
are even good for you! It won't do me any harm if I take just one little
drink..." Well you know what is going to happen. Never forget that the
human race with technology is just like an alcoholic with a barrel of wine.
204. Revolutionaries should have as many
children as they can. There is strong scientific evidence that social attitudes
are to a significant extent inherited. No one suggests that a social attitude
is a direct outcome of a person's genetic constitution, but it appears that
personality traits tend, within the context of our society, to make a person
more likely to hold this or that social attitude. Objections to these findings
have been raised, but objections are feeble and seem to be ideologically
motivated. In any event, no one denies that children tend on the average to
hold social attitudes similar to those of their parents. From our point of view
it doesn't matter all that much whether the attitudes are passed on genetically
or through childhood training. In either case the ARE passed on.
205. The trouble is that many of the people
who are inclined to rebel against the industrial system are also concerned
about the population problems, hence they are apt to have few or no children.
In this way they may be handing the world over to the sort of people who
support or at least accept the industrial system. To insure the strength of the
next generation of revolutionaries the present generation must reproduce itself
abundantly. In doing so they will be worsening the population problem only
slightly. And the most important problem is to get rid of the industrial
system, because once the industrial system is gone the world's population
necessarily will decrease (see paragraph 167); whereas, if the industrial
system survives, it will continue developing new techniques of food production
that may enable the world's population to keep increasing almost indefinitely.
206. With regard to revolutionary strategy,
the only points on which we absolutely insist are that the single overriding
goal must be the elimination of modern technology, and that no other goal can
be allowed to compete with this one. For the rest, revolutionaries should take
an empirical approach. If experience indicates that some of the recommendations
made in the foregoing paragraphs are not going to give good results, then those
recommendations should be discarded.
207.
An argument likely to be raised against our proposed revolution is that it is
bound to fail, because (it is claimed) throughout history technology has always
progressed, never regressed, hence technological regression is impossible. But
this claim is false.
208.
We distinguish between two kinds of technology, which we will call small-scale
technology and organization-dependent technology. Small-scale technology is
technology that can be used by small-scale communities without outside
assistance. Organization-dependent technology is technology that depends on
large-scale social organization. We are aware of no significant cases of
regression in small-scale technology. But organization-dependent technology
DOES regress when the social organization on which it depends breaks down.
Example: When the
209.
The reason why technology has seemed always to progress is that, until perhaps
a century or two before the Industrial Revolution, most technology was
small-scale technology. But most of the technology developed since the
Industrial Revolution is organization-dependent technology. Take the
refrigerator for example. Without factory-made parts or the facilities of a
post-industrial machine shop it would be virtually impossible for a handful of
local craftsmen to build a refrigerator. If by some miracle they did succeed in
building one it would be useless to them without a reliable source of electric
power. So they would have to dam a stream and build a generator. Generators
require large amounts of copper wire. Imagine trying to make that wire without
modern machinery. And where would they get a gas suitable for refrigeration? It
would be much easier to build an icehouse or preserve food by drying or
picking, as was done before the invention of the refrigerator.
210.
So it is clear that if the industrial system were once thoroughly broken down,
refrigeration technology would quickly be lost. The same is true of other
organization-dependent technology. And once this technology had been lost for a
generation or so it would take centuries to rebuild it, just as it took
centuries to build it the first time around. Surviving technical books would be
few and scattered. An industrial society, if built from scratch without outside
help, can only be built in a series of stages: You need tools to make tools to
make tools to make tools ... . A long process of economic development and
progress in social organization is required. And, even in the absence of an
ideology opposed to technology, there is no reason to believe that anyone would
be interested in rebuilding industrial society. The enthusiasm for
"progress" is a phenomenon particular to the modern form of society,
and it seems not to have existed prior to the 17th century or thereabouts.
211. In
the late Middle Ages there were four main civilizations that were about equally
"advanced":
212.
Would society EVENTUALLY develop again toward an industrial-technological form?
Maybe, but there is no use in worrying about it, since we can't predict or
control events 500 or 1,000 years in the future. Those problems must be dealt
with by the people who will live at that time.
213.
Because of their need for rebellion and for membership in a movement, leftists
or persons of similar psychological type are often unattracted to a rebellious
or activist movement whose goals and membership are not initially leftist. The
resulting influx of leftish types can easily turn a non-leftist movement into a
leftist one, so that leftist goals replace or distort the original goals of the
movement.
225.
These phenomena appeared clearly in
231.
Throughout this article we've made imprecise statements and statements that
ought to have had all sorts of qualifications and reservations attached to
them; and some of our statements may be flatly false. Lack of sufficient
information and the need for brevity made it impossible for us to fomulate our
assertions more precisely or add all the necessary qualifications. And of
course in a discussion of this
8.
(Paragraph 56) Yes, we know that 19th century America had its problems, and
serious ones, but for the sake of breviety we have to express ourselves in
simplified terms.